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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

CARE WORKING CONDITIONS:
THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF SOCIAL REPRODUCTIVE LABOR
FROM ARISTOTLE TO MARXIST FEMINISM
The spectre of an inescapably divided working class has haunted every generation of
marxist theorists, including the latest wave of marxist feminists engaged in the research
programme known as Social Reproduction Theory (SRT). In this dissertation, I will explain
how Marx’s clear theoretical debt to Aristotle extends into the marxist feminist analysis of
social reproductive labor and of the exploitation, class interests, and normative demands
which condition such care workers. I will demonstrate how SRT can follow Marx’s own
example in reading Aristotle, critically yet charitably, in order to resolve three problems.
First, Aristotle’s original concept of use value (built upon by marxist feminists) can help to
clarify how exploitation is mediated through hierarchical sub-classes. Second, one version
of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, which borrows from feminist care ethics, can offer marxist
feminism a ‘dialectical ethic’: as contexts change, so too should one’s requisite actions and
feelings in order to keep a balanced character exemplifying liberatory virtues (e.g. care and
justice) rather than reactionary vices (e.g. neglect and complicity). Third, Aristotle’s
nuanced concept of the common good (despite its problematic hierarchicalism) can inform
marxist feminism’s liberatory strategy, which involves transforming and aligning both the
external goods (e.g. material necessities) and internal goods (e.g. virtuous capabilities) of
each subclass in a patriarchal racialized class system.
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INTRODUCTION
The text you are reading is mine, but it is not my own; it was bought with a price.
No, not bought—stolen: a product of exploitation, oppression, and alienation. It represents
hundreds upon hundreds of hours of unpaid care work by my wife Julianne, who (due to
our nation’s infrastructural failures) had to put her own life projects on hold to solo-parent
and homeschool our children full time, in order to allow me to complete the research
manifested in this project. It represents all the graduate school rejections, college loan
denials, high school expulsions, and underfunded elementary school experiences which
conspired to keep an unknown student of color from receiving the graduate assistantship
that instead allowed me—a middle class white male—to earn a higher degree. But it also
represents the frankly unliveable wages which even the best among neoliberal universities
offer to ‘privileged’ graduate student workers such as myself, in exchange for teaching the
same number of classes as their senior colleagues among the tenured faculty (not including
the additional moonlighting jobs which only slightly offset the requisite student loans).
These are social problems which far outstrip the agency of any individual, myself included.
And yet, to varying degrees, we are all complicit. But these gradations of complicity
indicate the lurking presence of social structures which sort us into different positionalities.
While social interactions need not be zero-sum dynamics, hierarchy produces anergic
(rather than synergic) conditions. When the needs and abilities of some are overvalued,
they become privileges and powers at the expense of the marginalized and powerless. This
antagonism even manifests fractally within segmented subaltern groups.
The specter of an irreconcilably divided working class has haunted every

vi

generation of marxist theorists. This includes the latest wave of marxist feminists engaged
in the research programme known as Social Reproduction Theory (SRT), who examine
how identity-based hierarchies (with materialist roots) undermine working class solidarity
and revolutionary potential by partially privileging and empowering some workers at the
expense of others. In this dissertation, I will explain how Marx’s clear theoretical debt to
Aristotle extends into the marxist feminist analysis of social reproductive labor and the
exploitation, class interests, and normative demands which condition such care workers. I
will demonstrate how SRT can follow Marx’s own example in reading Aristotle critically
yet charitably in order to better theorize: (1) how exploitation is mediated through
hierarchical sub-classes, (2) how the interpersonal virtue of care functions as an exploitative
vice from the perspective of marxist feminism’s justice ethics, and (3) how a democratic
common good might be constructed to resolve the conflicting interests of productive and
reproductive sub-classes within the great chain of exploitation which constitutes a
patriarchal class society, whether ancient slavery or contemporary capitalism.
The past decade of late capitalism has constituted a breaking point in the post-Cold
War neoliberal consensus. The Great Recession of 2008 dispelled the bourgeois myth that
class status is an insignificant factor of social injustice compared to identitarian oppressions
on the basis of gender, race, sexuality, ability, etc. The 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential
elections featured a self-declared socialist candidate, who drew both mass coalitional
support and also criticism for being yet another white male supposedly peddling white male
aggrievement (itself a major force driving Trump to an electoral victory).
Yet the Trump era has shown clearly that the working class is not (and never has
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been) a predominantly white male demographic, but is instead a highly gendered and
racialized pool of exploitable—and thus organizable—labor. Women, especially women of
color, have organized a wave of public school teachers’ strikes, occupations of ICE
detention centers filled with imprisoned immigrant laborers, the #MeToo feminist
movement against sexual assault (primarily in the workplace), and Black Lives Matter
protests, marches, and uprisings. The latest generation of marxist feminists have viewed
these developments not as disparate advancements for women and non-binary people, but
rather as different fronts in a class war against patriarchal capitalism. And increasingly, they
explain this system with the conceptual tools of Social Reproduction Theory (SRT).
Although marxists feminists have made great strides in theorizing the social
reproductive labor which preconditions exploitable wage work, several significant
contradictions have surfaced within social reproduction theory (SRT) which I will
enumerate below. I argue that SRT might resolve these tensions by engaging with
Aristotle’s social and political insights not in spite of but because he remains perhaps the
foremost theoritical proponent of patriarchy and slavery. Since Aristotle is a significant
influence upon Karl Marx (and by extension marxist feminism), SRT has the opportunity to
consider how social reproductive care work functions within Aristotle’s understanding of
his own patriarchal class society.
Firstly, I argue that Aristotle’s economic concepts of use value and exchange value
(especially as different modes of surplus value) can elucidate the nature of mediated
exploitation which appears to characterize the relationship between an indirectly exploited
social reproductive worker and directly exploited productive worker. The idea of use value
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is particularly important for understanding how the post-industrial U.S. has shifted to a
service economy. The emotional labor and care work which has often characterized home
life and a secondary sector of the labor market (consisting of disproportionately Black,
Latina, and Asian women) in the process of becoming the predominant type of wage work.
While this type of labor is more concrete in certain ways, insofar as service work directly
provides use values, it is abstract in others, insofar as its use values are largely consumed by
other workers, who produce surplus exchange values to be extracted by the ruling class.
Survival and subsistence are once again the primary life-functions for a majority of citizens
and residents in the ‘developed’ world. This deliberate historical regression invites
economic insights not only from Marx’s 19th-century capitalist society but also from
Aristotle’s patriarchal slave society in ancient Greece. In the first chapter, I draw an analogy
between mediated exploitation in the ancient world (viz. the wife’s positionality between
the patriarch and the slave) and in contemporary capitalism (viz. the productive laborer’s
positionality between the capitalist bourgeoisie and the growing ranks of social
reproductive workers). I conclude that the privileged and marginalized layers of the
working class are both exploited, and that class-based solidarity is possible between them.
Secondly, I argue that Aristotle’s ethical concepts of virtue and vice (in dialogue
with some feminist care ethicists who frame care as a virtue) can be used by marxist
feminists to articulate a ‘dialectical’personal ethics which can resolve theoretical
contradicitons through praxis over time. Because marxist feminism focuses on
macrostructural injustices which can be rectified only through collective action, it leaves the
individual moral agent without a substantive moral imperative deeper than avoiding
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microaggressions on the one hand or supporting collective struggles against macrostructural
injustices on the other. While these conditions are necessary for embodying marxist feminist
values, they are insufficient. The former prefigures liberation as an inherently good end but
only at an interpersonal level, while the latter configures liberation as a means to eventually
construct goodness at the social level. The connection between these two scales is the
individual moral agent (e.g. a radicalized care worker) who faces both concrete relational
commitments and abstract social duties. Social reproductive labor illustrates this tension:
care work functions as a benevolent virtue when viewed at the interpersonal scale, but as
an exploitation-enabling vice when viewed at the socio-systemic scale. Although marxist
feminism is consequentialist (valuing ‘impact over intent’), the most controllable factor in
the liberation struggle to abolish patriarchal racialized capitalism is each political subject’s
character motives. Although marxist feminism has not produced a properly normative
ethical theory, it has a long tradition of prescribing character growth to its adherents. For
instance, communist organizer Rosa Luxemburg exhorted class-conscious workers to
cultivate self-discipline and ‘socialist civic virtues’. Bolshevik feminist Alexandra Kollontai
called upon the men and women of the working class to develop egalitarian relationships to
replace the hierarchical relations exemplified in traditional marriages and families. Black
Panther Shirley Williams drew up a moral code of revolutionary discipline for the
movement’s children (as well as adults) who were drawn in by the Party’s famous breakfast
program. And the Black lesbian socialists of the Combahee Workers Collective called for
different but (hopefully) convergent modes of self-criticism and self-discipline for radicals
of color and their (often chauvinistic) white fellow travellers. The specific nature of
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character-building varies according to the moral community’s hierarchical positionalities
(along the axes of class, race, gender, sexuality, etc). I argue that marxist feminists must
articulate a dialectical ethic which can account for such undertheorized norms. I conclude
that a combination of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and the feminist ethic of care can
provide marxist feminists with a theory which balances between the particular and
universal, the relative and the absolute, motives and consequences, and egoism and
altruism.
Thirdly, I will argue that marxist feminism implicitly endorses Aristotle’s political
concept of the common good: even though this appears to function ideologically to justify
exploitation, it actually functions dialectically as the shifting horizon of shared interests
between different (sub)classes. In the wake of the 2008 financial crash and subsequent
government bailout of only the wealthy ruling class, thousands of protesters in countless
cities chanted “We are the 99%!” This rallying cry of the 2011 Occupy Wall Street
demonstrations posited a common economic interest among nearly all sectors of the nation
(in fact, a multitude of nations). However, after this mass movement was crushed by the
state, leftists reconsidered its coalitional strategy. Some continued using this rhetoric and
coalesced around the social democratic campaigns of Bernie Sanders. However, others
criticized this movement as economistic and ‘class reductionist,’ claiming that it sacrificed
the particular interests of oppressed subalterns to the ‘lowest common denominator’
interests of the (white) majority of the populace. Debates raged about whether, for instance,
‘Medicare for All’ or ‘'Black Reparations’ was a more effective strategy for rectifying
economic inequities (which vary according to the amount of wealth historically stolen by
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the ruling class).1 After two cycles of such disagreements, social reproduction theorists
Cinzia Arruzza, Tithi Bhattacharya, and Nancy Fraser published a book called “Feminism
for the 99%.” Reflecting on their own political praxis in organizing the International
Women’s Strike, Arruzza, Bhattacharya, and Fraser speculated what would take to create
an intersectional movement which respects particular needs of the special oppressed while
acknowledging the need for mass movements. Their nuanced approach toward coalitions
(in light of class, gender, race, and sexuality) entails that a common good is not a given;
instead, it must be constructed. I argue that, in order to account philosophically for a
strategy of solidarity across the often gendered and racialized gap between productive and
social reproductive workers, marxist feminists can re-appropriate the Aristotelian model of
the common good.

1

Gray, 1.
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CHAPTER 1. MEDIATED EXPLOITATION:
SOCIAL REPRODUCTION AND LABOR ARISTOCRACY

1.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will examine how any class society—that is, a society striated by a
ruling class and an exploited working class—relies on the creation of hierarchically
organized and mutually antagonistic subclasses. This often takes the form of a division of
labor between production, which is the human generation of use values or exchange
values, and social reproduction, which is the regeneration of the capacity to produce value.
Social reproduction is both a specific type of production and also the precondition for all
types of production. It may seem odd to counterpose a genus (production) with a species
(social reproduction). However, this distinction is meant to convey the difference between
that labor which is the cause of human labor power (i.e. reproduction) and that labor which
is the effect of actualized human labor power (i.e. production). According to marxist
feminists, this division of labor is a major cause not only of gender differentiation and the
patriarchal power structuring but also of class formation and the opposition of economic
interests.1
Marxist feminists maintain that the main obstacle to solidarity among subclasses (a
phenomenon referred to as ‘dividing the working class’) is not the identitarian protests of
marginalized subalterns, who are often super-exploited.2 Rather, it is the temptation for

1
2

Vogel, 170.
While the term “super-exploited” lacks rhetorical sophistication, it is a technical term used since
the 1970s by marxist feminists such as Marlene Dixon and anti-imperialist such as Ruy
Mauro Marini.
1

those workers inhabiting relatively privileged socio-economic positionalities to identify
with their exploiters rather than with their fellow workers.3
These subclass functions are often indexed to identity markers, such as race,
nationality, and especially gender, which produce the multiply-oppressed subjects studied
by intersectionality theory.4 However, this proliferation of compound identities (including
aspects such as race, sexuality, ability, nationality, etc.) has revealed a new theoretical
problem. If these aspects cross-cut one another, then the result is a sparsely populated
absolute subaltern category (e.g. disabled, undocumented, working-class lesbians of color),
a sparsely populated absolute dominant category (e.g. abled, documented, wealthy cishet
white men), with a massively populated intermediate category consisting of those
oppressed in some aspects and dominant in others. In theory, if enough (hierarchalized)
identity aspects and subgroupings are introduced, the exponential result would be a global
population entirely atomized according to micro-positionalities and totally differentiated
interests. Such individuals would have no material or ideological basis on which to
strategically organize themselves to produce systemic change, because nearly all of them
would benefit in at least some way from the status quo. Such subdivisions can make
solidarity—the confluence of interests—nearly impossible. Tithi Bhattacharya presents the
apparent problem experienced by marxists who are marginalized by gender or race:

3

4

The marxist tradition contains an ongoing debate about the status of privileged members of the
working class. The more pessimistic view contends that they constitute a ‘labor aristocracy’ who
inescapably share interests with the ruling class against those of more oppressed workers (E.O.
Wright, 115; Delphy, 15; Barbalet, 133-34; Sakai, 25).
Collins, 28.
2

“[B]ecause white workers in the Global North typically earn more than
workers of color, there can never be common grounds of struggle uniting
them, as the very real, material, empirically documented difference between
them will always fuel white racism. The same can be said about the real
material differences between men and women. What is interesting about
these very real situations is that to try to challenge them within the context
set by capitalism—or capitalist reality—would have two consequences:
either failure (for example, as in the numerous historical instances where
sexism and/or racism overwhelm or choke the workers’ movement) or a
political strategy that seeks to overcome such differences of race/gender
between workers by moral appeals, asking people to ‘do the right thing’
even if it is not in their immediate interest to do so.”5
Yet Bhattacharya ultimately rejects this pessimistic dilemma by calling for workers from all
different strata to join forces in solidarity to overcome both the competitive individualism of
the labor market and the oppressive hierarchization of social identities. As she writes,
“Strategic organizing on the basis of such a vision can reintroduce the idea that an injury to
[one] is actually an injury to all.”6 However, this theoretical basis for praxis assumes a
convergence of interests which is not yet sufficiently provided by the branch of marxist
feminism known as Social Reproduction Theory (SRT). In my third chapter, I will
elaborate on the requisite conditions for such solidarity. In this chapter, I will articulate the
socio-economic obstacles which preclude it.
There has recently been a critical reappropriation of second-wave marxist feminist
analyses of the domestic division of labor and the unwaged labor which preconditions
wage work. This has involved revisiting the 1970s ‘domestic labor debate’ between the
orthodox dual systems theory (DST) and the heterodox unitary system theory (UST).7 The
DST school insisted that feminine-coded domestic labor reproduces use values which are
5
6
7

Bhattacharya, 14-15, emphasis added.
Bhattacharya, 89-90.
Vogel, 152; Weeks, 118.
3

extracted directly by a gendered ruling class (viz. men as husbands). The UST school
disagreed: such feminized housework does produce use value in the specific form of labor
power (e.g. the capacity of a husband to work his waged job), but the ultimate form of
actualized labor power is extractable exchange value. For the purposes of my analysis, it is
rather irrelevant whether DST or UST is true, because—unlike many of the theorists
cited—I am not trying to explain the emergence of gender or patriarchy. Instead, I am
trying to explain mediated exploitation and how it creates and hierarchically structures
subclasses, often on the basis of identity factors such as gender, race, or ability. What is
important about the UST-DST split is how each theory safeguards an indispensable value:
DST insists on intersectional sensitivity and UST insists on intra-class solidarity.
Marxist feminists have used the theoretical insights of SRT to explain the hidden
gendered (and racialized and sexualized) forms of exploitation beneath the wage labor
market, and they have wielded SRT practically to strategize liberation through direct
actions such as those organized by the Wages for Housework movement in the 1970s and
the International Women’s Strike in recent years.8
The first generation of SRT resolved the problem of intra-working-class solidarity
by positing that although gender relations (like other identity-based dynamics) are indeed
sites of economic value-extraction, this class conflict does not map neatly onto the
male-female binary. According to Silvia Federici, the systemic function of the division of
labor between masculinized production and feminized social reproduction is to

8

Although the same phenomena of domestic labor have been examined by other subfields (e.g.
feminist economics), SRT’s explanatory model is distinctive both for its historical materialist
presuppositions and for its commitment to revolutionary praxis (including yet exceeding the
policy reforms implied by more liberal research programmes).
4

hierarchically divide the working class to keep all wages low. The fact that marginalized
and privileged laborers usually both seek higher pay implies that they share a common
interest in resisting capital and therefore potentially have mutual solidarity.9
However, while the first generation of SRT dealt primarily with the nexus of
capitalism and patriarchy, the second generation has compounded that intersection by
foregrounding racism, colonialism, cisheteropatriarchy, and even ageism.10 The second
generation of SRT has attempted to navigate “the rise of ‘identity politics’ [and] the
decentering of class” which has characterized the “postsocialist” condition of leftist theory
and praxis in the neoliberal era.11 By wielding the key concept of social reproduction,
recent SRT theorists have attempted to connect the political demands for economic
redistribution and social recognition (i.e. civil rights). SRT insists that historical materialism
exceeds intersectionality theory in its ability to account for overlapping oppressions—for
instance, the positionality of a female care worker of color.12 However, despite its major
sociological contributions, the latest wave of marxist feminist SRT has not yet adequately
explained the dynamics of mediated exploitation: i.e., precisely identifying the culpability
for the extracted surplus value at each node of the economic hierarchy.13

9
10

11
12
13

Federici, 55, 73.
Inspired by the 2013 revised publication of Lise Vogel’s Marxism and the Oppression of Women:
Toward a Unitary Theory (1983), a recent collection edited by Tithi Bhattacharya called Social
Reproduction Theory: Remapping Classing, Recentering Oppression (2017) illustrates the latest
and more intersectional wave of SRT. In it, Susan Ferguson and Serap Saritas Oran focus on age,
Alan Sears writes about queer sexuality, Bhattacharya herself examines nationality, and David
McNally surveys different theories of intersectionality.
Fraser (1997), 2.
McNally, 108-110; Collins, 26.
While this materialist conception of socio-economic culpability may appear to be unduly
structuralist (and thus deterministic), I will offer a complementary account of subjective agency in
Chapter 2. Ultimately I follow Naila Kabeer in trying to navigate a via media between the
individual-based voluntarism of liberal ethics or mainstream economics and the systemic
determinism of structuralist sociology (Kabeer, 326-7).
5

This lacuna has implications for the theoretical possibility of cross-subclass
solidarity. I propose that, in order to resolve the conceptual problem presented by working
class hierarchical subdivisions, marxist feminists follow Karl Marx’s own example by
reading Aristotle’s economic texts.14 In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle reflects on an
abstract and derivative mode of value distinct from consumptive ‘use value’, a concept
which becomes known as ‘exchange value.’ For Marx’s own theorizing, exchange value
becomes an integral component in the critique of capitalism, because capitalism is the only
classist mode of production geared toward producing exchange values rather than use
values.15 SRT marxist feminists have disagreed about whether social reproductive labor
directly produces exploitable exchange value, or whether it produces those use values
which enable others to produce exploitable exchange values. I propose that Aristotle’s
examination of a different mode of production—one in which use values are more
visible—can illuminate the contemporary economic relationship between productive and
social reproductive laborers. I argue that contrasting the Aristotelian model of a culturally
embedded economy with modern capitalism’s culturally disembedded economy can help
SRT better understand the mechanism by which a division of labor produces a division of
interests.

14

15

Roll, 20. George McCarthy writes: “Marx is repulsed by the despotic and authoritarian structure
of this ancient economy based on the domination of women and slaves. However, Aristotle’s
economic theory does provide the foundation stone for his later economics in Capital”
(McCarthy, 11).
The type of exchange value that Marx is most interested in is the wage, the supposedly equal
transaction of some of a worker’s labor power for a portion of a capitalist’s wealth (Marx, Capital
Vol. I, 128). While wage labor existed in the ancient world, it was peripheral to the ubiquitous
form of production: slave labor, which was (obviously) unwaged.
6

It is counter-intuitive (to say the least) to recommend that marxist feminist SRT
looks to Aristotle’s work for insights into the nature of mediated exploitation: Aristotle is
one of history’s most infamous ideological apologists for patriarchy and slavery.16 Yet I
argue that, insofar as marxism is already theoretically indebted to Aristotle, Aristotle’s
analysis of the ancient hierarchical oikos can serve as a microcosmic model in which to
track how mediated exploitation works in a patriarchal class society.17 In Politics, Aristotle
depicts the ancient household (oikos) as a gendered class structure, which marxist feminists
would analyze as consisting of productive and social reproductive domestic labor
performed by slaves and wives.
I suggest that the Aristotelian role of housewife should continue to interest marxist
feminists even in the post-nuclear-family paradigm of the 21st century. Even though the
housewife is no longer the most relevant exemplar of social reproductive labor, historic
variations of the housewife role have often occupied an intermediate positionality on the
chain of extraction. I propose that the ancient oikos provides a compelling contrast case to
first-generation SRT’s model of the nuclear housewife: in another (older) mode of
production, social reproduction can instead be performed by a man (e.g. the slave) for a
woman (e.g. the wife). Precisely because the socio-economic positionality of the ancient
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Coole, 19; Okin, 74; Saxonhouse, 63; Elshtain, 41.
Despite his obvious critique of the latter’s hierarchicalism, Marx praises “the brilliancy of
Aristotle’s genius” (Marx, Grundrisse, 541) and refers to him as “the greatest thinker of antiquity”
(Marx, Capital Vol. I, 532). Even Marx’s critique is blunted by historicism: “If a giant thinker like
Aristotle erred in his appreciation of slave labour, why should a dwarf economist like Bastiat be
right in his appreciation of wage labour?” (Marx, Capital Vol. I, 175). In traversing intellectual
history, it is not my intention to discover and defend a less sexist and less classist Aristotle
(although there are scholars who have pursued such a hermeneutic project). Rather, I am simply
reading Aristotle both as the most representative theorist of his era’s class structure and as the first
(proto)economist to articulate the two modes of value which explain the socio-material
conditions of the polis (composed of oikoi).
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housewife differs from contemporary female workers, it can illuminate both the different
possible intersections of gender and class and the constant structure of mediated
exploitation.
In the Aristotelian oikos, the obvious exploiter is the patriarch, whose freedom from
the burden of labor is reliant on the exploitative work of both his slaves and his wife, who
manages the slaves. I will employ the Aristotelian (and later marxist) concepts of use value
and exchange value in order to explain how the managerial wife’s own labor power
depends upon the social reproductive labor of her slaves. As a domestic worker, the
archetype of the housewife represents mediated exploitation—a primary obstacle to both
working class solidarity and the possibility of constructing a classless common good. Yet I
will demonstrate that even the privileged subclass of housewives in antiquity, which is
reliant on the reproductive labor of slaves, is not itself technically part of the exploitative
ruling class, which is composed entirely of patriarchs. I will propose that this conclusion
has significant bearing on how to theorize about the possibility of shared interests and
solidarity between the productive and reproductive subclasses, especially when they are
oppressed according to gender or other identity aspects.18

1.2 Marxist Feminism
Marxist feminism is a normative project dedicated to dismantling both class-based
economic exploitation (i.e. capitalism) and gender-based socio-political oppression
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Nancy Fraser points out that calls for coalition-building between different interest groups are
hopeless so long as they merely advocate “additive combinations among already formed
constituencies” rather than advocating “novel social arrangements that could transform the
identities and harmonize the interests of diverse, currently fragmented constituencies” (Fraser
[1997], 4).
8

(i.e. patriarchy). Its proponents are both empowered and imperiled by being situated at the
intersection of two political traditions: marxism and feminism. Because these two traditions
often have divergent understandings of concepts such as gender and class, they also
employ different definitions of evaluative concepts such as patriarchy and exploitation.19
Following the practice of Communist parties, many marxist feminists distinguish between
(special) oppressions and exploitation. In this framing, oppression refers to the
socio-political, intersubjective conditions of an individual (regardless of class) who is
mistreated on the basis of their identity (along the lines of gender, race, sexuality, ability,
etc.).20 The special oppression which marxist feminists have focused on primarily is
patriarchy. This is a term shared with most feminists since the Second Wave that identifies
their structural nemesis: the nearly universal tendency to privilege and empower men and/or
males above women and/or females. Materialist explanations can take very different forms,
insofar as they disagree on whether patriarchy and class society form two different systems
or one single system.21
Marxists define exploitation as the objective, material condition of a working-class
(i.e. property-less) individual whose labor produces surplus value which is appropriated by
a ruling-class property owner. For Marxists, capitalism is simply the latest form of
exploitative class society, which has become a nearly global tendency to distribute the
means of production as private property, to organize production through markets (both of
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This is because—as both traditions emphasize—observation is theory-laden, and ‘factual’
descriptions often presuppose evaluations.
This distinction is a later development in marxism, as Marx and Engels use the two terms
interchangeably to describe and explain class structures (Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the
Communist Party, 474).
Delphy, 75; Mies (1998), 7-8; Manning, 7-8. Delphy is a dual-systems theorist, while Mies and
Manning are unitary-system theorists.
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workers competing for jobs and employers competing for customers), and to organize
consumption largely as the (re)investment of profit (i.e. the surplus beyond subsistence).
While all other modes of production function to produce a surplus of use values (e.g.
stockpiles of grain), capitalism functions to produce a surplus of exchange values (e.g.
stock market gains on the price of grain).22
Marxist feminists have taken up these key economic concepts in order to explain
the same phenomena that interests liberal feminists—gender, sexism, and patriarchy. By
framing these in historical materialist terms, marxist feminists have argued that economic
conditions have influenced and even determined women’s social positionalities throughout
history.23 These materialist explanations—and their respective liberatory strategies—can
differ widely, depending on whether they conceptualize patriarchy and class society as two
different systems or as one single system.24 Since the New Left era of the 1970s, dual
systems theory (DST) and unitary systems theory (UST) have grappled with how the
gendered division of labor maintains the antagonism between the interests of masculinized
productive workers and feminized reproductive workers.

1.3 Dual Systems Theory and Unitary System Theory
SRT began as a unitary system theory explaining the homogeneity of class
exploitation and sexist patriarchy (as opposed to dual systems theory which conceptualizes
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These other modes of production include not only slavery and feudalism but also ‘primitive’
communism and modern state socialism. I elaborate upon the crucial distinction between use
value and exchange value below.
Arruzza, 12; Bhattacharya, 5.
As Shulamith Firestone reiterates, “Before we can act to change a situation... we must know how it
has arisen and evolved” (Firestone, 2).
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them as separate social structures). UST offers an explanation of how mediated exploitation
organizes class interests in a merely contingent way, which makes a cross-positionality
coalition possible. However, this is challenged by DST’s compelling explanation of how
interlocking oppressions function in an exploitative class system. For DST, patriarchy is a
separate social structure from capitalism. Although patriarchy and capitalism reinforce each
other, they are distinct—and this distinction is not simply between a superstructural
epiphenomenon (patriarchy) and a material base (capitalism), but also between two distinct
types of economic infrastructures. In the DST model, patriarchy is its own separate mode of
production (viz. unpaid domestic labor), operating in parallel to capitalism.25 For DST
theorist Christine Delphy, the key structure for womanhood is wifehood, which she defines
as a socio-economic class that is distinct from and exploitatively subordinate to
husbandhood.26 As Juliet Mitchell argues, these two socio-economic structures are
distinguished conceptually and functionally, if not materially: the woman’s condition of
being exploited and oppressed (perhaps by the same man) constitutes a “complex—not a
simple—unity.”27
Among DST’s most convincing premises is the fact that patriarchy historically
precedes capitalism, which suggests that their relationship is not a necessary correlation (let
alone identity).28 The dual systems approach takes its cue from Marx’s intellectual partner
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Delphy, 73; Hartmann, 3. According to Gibson-Graham, “Noncapitalism is found in the
household, the place of woman, related to capitalism through service and complementarity... it
appears as a pre-capitalist mode of production… [and] it appears as socialism” (Gibson-Graham,
7).
Delphy, 72.
Juliet Mitchell identifies the four overdetermining structures of this complex unity as:
“Production, Reproduction, Sex, and Socialisation of Children” (Mitchell, 26).
Arruzza, 11.
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Friedrich Engels, who applied the methodology of historical materialism to the existence of
patriarchy in The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State.29 Engels explains
how class property relations and the gendered division of labor are historical privations of
an earlier matriarchal collectivism.30 For DST adherents, even though modern women’s
domestic labor reproduces the entire class structure (i.e. capitalism), its chief beneficiaries
are not distant capitalists but rather the local men of the house. DST proponent Heidi
Hartmann warns that any ‘marriage’ between marxism and feminism will ultimately
suppress women’s liberation in favor of economic revolution, because women’s
exploitation (i.e. patriarchal oppression as an economic dynamic) is actually in men’s
interests.31
However, another current of theorists have upheld marxist feminism not only as a
viable theory but as a praxis which can construct working-class solidarity across gender
lines. Social Reproduction Theory developed primarily within UST, which holds that
patriarchy and capitalism are simply two aspects of the selfsame social system, which
oppresses and exploits women and gender non-conforming individuals.32 For UST,
patriarchy is not itself a distinct gendered mode of production as with DST (let alone a
self-reproducing ideological system, as asserted by certain liberal feminisms). The corollary
claim is that not all men are exploiters and not all women are exploited.33 UST insists that
(in Hartmann’s critical description), in spite of “the appearance that women are working for
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Bezanson and Luxton, 26-27.
Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, 739.
Hartmann, 5. She famously warns that for marxist feminists, “marxism and feminism are one, and
that one is marxism” (Hartmann, 2).
Mies (1988), 37-38.
Arruzza, 9.
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men privately in the home,” it is actually the case that “women work for capital” instead of
for their male partners.34 UST theorists MariaRosa Dalla Costa and Selma James describe
the home as “a colony governed by indirect rule” of capital, and that the housewife “is the
slave of a waged slave.”35 This view implies that patriarchy is indeed a system of
exploitation, but one which is internally essential for a class society’s dominant mode of
production (e.g. capitalism).36
Some unitary systems theorists helped to form the first generation of SRT, which
offered its own explanation of mediated exploitation. In the 1970s, the international Wages
for Housework campaign (launched by marxist feminists such as Dalla Costa, James, and
Silvia Federici) attempted to demand payment for this unremunerated reproductive labor.
Yet this demand was made not of their husbands and male partners (as DST might suggest),
but rather of the capitalist state (which Marx and Engels call the executive committee of the
ruling class).37 Echoing Frantz Fanon, Dalla Costa and James warn that the exploited will
fight each other if they do not fight their mutual exploiter.38 Because it permitted
inter-gender solidarity among male and female workers, WFH was described as the “most
controversial” development of the women’s liberation movement.39
Moreover, WFH activists in the first generation of SRT were criticized for a type of
white feminism which does not address the experiences and interests of many
multiply-oppressed people (e.g. working class women of color). By contrast, second
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Dalla Costa and James, 56, 58.
Arruzza, 7.
Federici, 9, 12; Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, 475.
Dalla Costa and James, 57.
Federici, 54. Yet even Heidi Hartmann (a DST proponent) applauded the WFH campaign for
raising leftist consciousness about the significance of domestic labor (Hartmann, 7-8).
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generation SRT examines the degree to which identitarian oppression and economic
exploitation can be explained through the thematic of social reproduction (and especially
social reproductive labor). This was seen in practice in March 2018 in the International
Women’s Strike. This action (organized by SRT theorists Tithi Bhattacharya, Cinzia
Arruzza, Nancy Fraser, and others) was a deliberate radicalization of the liberal feminist
tendencies of the earlier Women’s March, which had been criticized for ignoring the
classed, raced, and queered aspects of women’s oppression.40 Because recent SRT
proponents attempt to provide a more intersectional analysis than their Second Wave
feminist foremothers, they may appear to endorse DST rather than UST. However, by
wielding historical materialism’s dialectical understanding of oppressive systems as being
internally contradictory rather than externally conflictual, recent contributions to SRT avoid
the additive atomism of intersectionality theories such as DST.41
However, despite its improvements, recent SRT still shares DST’s main theoretical
weakness: the fragmentation problem. Arruzza recognizes this, insisting that “diversity
must become our weapon, rather than an obstacle or something that divides us.”42
Movements such as the International Women’s Strike demonstrate the possibility of
building a multicultural united front against capitalism. However, because these aspects of
oppression (e.g. gender identity, race, sexuality, ability, nationality, etc.) are explained by
SRT at least in part by their economic roles in social reproduction, there is an exponential
proliferation of possible positionalities within the great chain of extraction. The multiple
variations within this “complex unity” deconstruct the binary distinction between the ‘labor
40
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Bhattacharya, 19; Arruzza (2017), 192, 195.
Arruzza (2017), 195-196; McNally, 99.
Arruzza (2017), 196.
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aristocratic’ privileged workers and the multiply-oppressed super-exploited workers.43 Yet
this analytical complication makes solidarity less, not more, possible: the model now
contains countless minute differentials between the more exploited (and thus less
exploitative) and the less exploited (and thus more exploitative).
In the remainder of this chapter, I will argue that Aristotle’s proto-economic insights
can help SRT to reframe the value of social reproductive labor in order to determine the
degree of complicity borne by a labor aristocracy (whatever its class boundaries may be). I
will examine how the mode of exploitation—effectuated through the division of
labor—hierarchically divides workers’ interests according to how they consume in relation
to what they (re)produce.

1.4 Social Reproduction
While 19th century orthodox marxism focused on manual labor and commodity
production and 20th century Western marxism focused on desire and consumption,
contemporary marxist feminists focus on the social reproduction of value-producing human
labor power itself. Social reproduction is the most interesting type of production to marxist
feminists, because it is classed and gendered (and often also racialized, sexualized, and
‘able-ized’). Marxist feminists redefine Marx’s philosophical anthropology by rendering
human beings not primarily as the productive laboring animal, but the reproductive laboring
animal.
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McNally, 110. This dialectical type of systems thinking (which is obvious in Marx’s more
Hegelian texts) gives the lie to critiques by anti-marxists such as Gibson-Graham, who insists that
capitalism is not hegemonic but rather “at loose ends with itself” (Gibson-Graham, ix).
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Although the concept of social reproduction is broader than that of domestic labor,
it often takes the form of unpaid care work which is often performed by a woman in her
family’s home.44 However, as Lise Vogel emphasizes, the essential attribute of social
reproduction is the replenishment of labor power. Labor power, in turn, is the “capacity for
useful labor” which is “consumed” via the process of production.45 Social reproduction
(using a broad definition) can take three forms: the daily replenishment of an individual’s
ability to work, the intergenerational replenishment of the workforce en masse, and the
wholistic perpetuation of the mode of production of the entire society.46 Federici narrows
the concept to social reproductive labor: the set of tasks (typically performed in a familial
home) which are necessary to sustain a productive laborer to return to their paid job. Such
social reproductive labor was typically the role of a housewife who cooked, cleaned, and
performed affective labor for her wage-working husband, and gestated, birthed, and cared
for her children—the next generation of laborers.47
Increasingly, however, these tasks have been deterritorialized and reterritorialized
within the waged labor market.48 Today, a woman’s social reproductive labor often
involves caring for additional productive wage workers: her elderly but still employed
parent, her working adult child who still lives with her, and especially for herself.49 This last
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Bezanson and Luxton, 32; Arruzza, 21. Laslett and Brenner provide a standard (though limited
and contestable) definition of social reproduction: “the activities and attitudes, behaviors and
emotions, responsibilities and relationships directly involved in the maintenance of life on a
daily basis, and intergenerationally… includ[ing] various kinds of work—mental, manual, and
emotional” (Laslett and Brenner, 382-83).
Marx, Capital Vol. I, 283; Vogel, 138.
Hartmann, 6; Vogel, 27, 158-69; Federici, 5; Bhattacharya, 6.
Federici, 49. However, the nuclear family as a unit of reproduction was never very stable:
capitalism has historically maintained women as a reserve army of labor who are sometimes
forced to work outside the home as well as inside it (Dalla Costa and James, 54).
Federici, 49.
The ‘self-care’ which this involves is not leisurely personal indulgence, but rather the unpaid
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responsibility is due to the neoliberal expectation that working class women should work a
‘double shift’: the unwaged second shift of domestic labor is the necessary preparation for
the next day’s first shift at a waged job.50
Social reproductive labor is one type of social reproduction, which is in turn one
type of production. However, at the micro-level at which workers live their lives,
production and reproduction often take on opposed yet complementary roles—even though
the latter is technically one specific form of the former. In SRT’s framing, social
reproduction and commodity production are merely two phases of a single, cyclical
process.51 It is the very continuity of these aspects which makes it difficult for the marxist
analysis of exploitation to track surplus value upwards through the economic hierarchy.
Federici argues that the traditional domestic division of labor between productive
and reproductive labor is a bourgeois strategy to divide and conquer the working class
along gender lines.52 Despite the interdependence of producers and reproducers, capital
deviously divides such laborers between the ‘productive’ and the ‘non-productive,’ pitting
the latter against the former as dependents who must earn their keep indirectly off the
market.53 Even though the capitalist economy’s entire labor force is (re)created by social
reproductive labor (often in the form of unwaged housework), it often goes uncompensated
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off-the-clock disciplines which are de facto job requirements of every worker, in order to prepare
them to work. A worker’s sleep regimen, personal hygiene routine, meal plans, and commute all
revolve around their job and must be tended to as if they were officially parts of it (James, 21).
This has been the case for Black women for much longer, dating back to the U.S.’s slavery era
(Davis, 238). Likewise, as Maria Mies writes, the integration of Indian women lace workers “into a
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labourers. It is precisely this fact—their not being free wage-labourers, but housewives—which
makes capital accumulation possible in this sector” (Mies [1981], 500).
Bhattacharya, 3.
Federici, 8.
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because it is seen as not producing value.54 Capital keeps its labor costs low by relying on
such unwaged labor as a precondition for the labor which is officially recognized in the
formal waged economy. This illusion can be sustained only because the exchange values
circulating in the market are ultimately dependent upon use values which are (re)produced
and consumed elsewhere—often at home.

1.5 Use Value and Exchange Value
Marxist feminists insist that the standard description of value production (shared by
many bourgeois and marxist economics) is superficially misleading, and they challenge the
claim that a productive worker produces his own means of subsistence by himself. Instead,
they argue, the productivity of such an exploited worker is often offloaded onto other
(unseen) workers who support him by performing social reproductive labor, which
produces surplus value in the form of either use value or exchange value.
These concepts of use value and exchange value are so foundational to the marxist
theory of exploitation that Marx begins his very first chapter of Capital Volume I with a
section concerning these two “factors of the commodity.”55 Yet the genealogy of this
conceptual pair long predates Marx, extending back through the bourgeois classical
economists (e.g. Adam Smith and David Ricardo) beyond Scholasticism (e.g. St. Thomas
Aquinas) all the way back to Aristotle, who first articulated the distinction between value in
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Dalla Costa and James, 43. Within SRT there has been a further debate about whether or not social
reproductive labor produces exchange value in addition to producing use value. Benston and
Vogel posit that the product of social reproductive labor is simply use value, while Dalla Costa,
James, and Federici insist that it is exchange value (Hopkins, 131).
Marx, Capital Vol. I, 125.
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use and value in exchange.56 According to Marx, ‘use value’ is an attribute of some good
or service which “satisfies human needs,” either “directly as a means of subsistence, i.e. an
object of consumption, or indirectly as a means of production.”57 Use value is the
qualitative property of a good or service which is directly consumed to fulfill some need or
want. By contrast, ‘exchange value’ is the additional quantitative property of such a good
or service which renders it capable of being equally traded for another commodity or
commodities.58 Because exchange value operates indirectly as a means rather than directly
as an end, it represents the distribution of goods rather than presenting a good for
consumption.
Marxism accepts the common view that use values are produced by material
conditions and by human labor which can transform such natural resources.59 However,
marxism takes a more counter-intuitive stance on exchange values by claiming that they
can be produced by only one cause: human labor.60 While every product has a use value,
not every product also has an exchange value: thus, only certain types of consumable
goods or services are commodities.61 And among these types of exchange-valued
commodities, marxists are especially interested in one particular type: the only one with the
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Haney, 47.
Marx, Capital Vol. I, 125.
Marx, Capital Vol. I, 138. Marx writes that “use-values… are only commodities because they
have a dual nature, because they are at the same time objects of utility and bearers of [exchange]
value” (Marx, Capital Vol. I, 138).
Marx, Capital Vol. I, 133-34.
Marx notes that the bourgeois capitalist (a member of a distinct type of ruling class) seeks “to
produce not only a use-value, but a commodity; not only use-value, but value; and not just value,
but also surplus-value” (Marx, Capital Vol. I, 293).
Marx, Grundrisse, 267-268; Benston, 14; Mandel, 10-11.
19

capacity to create a surplus of exchange value in excess of the sum of its inputs. This
commodity is human labor power.62
In any economic system, a worker consumes (i.e. uses or exhausts) their own labor
power to produce a surplus value above and beyond their own means of subsistence: the
necessary conditions for living to work another day.63 In a class society (such as patriarchal
slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and even state socialism), some property owner claims the
right to extract this surplus from the worker: that is, to exploit their productivity. Under
capitalism, surplus value takes the form of exchange value: the commodities are produced
precisely to be sold for profits (part of which are reinvested as capital), rather than to be
used or even exchanged merely at cost. But in pre- or non-capitalist societies, human labor
power typically has only use value, not exchange value. Like other types of exchange,
labor markets often still exist in such economies (e.g. ancient Athens), but they do not
constitute the dominant relation of production as under capitalism.
Aristotle lays out the idea of exchange value in a discussion on distributive justice:
“[A]ll things that are exchanged must be somehow commensurable… All goods must
therefore be measured by some one thing.”64 This concept is abstracted from the more
intuitive notion of use value which he describes in a discussion of external goods: “all
things useful are useful for a purpose, and where there is too much of them they must either
do harm, or at any rate be of no use.”65 Paradoxically, Aristotle has been regarded as the
father of two conflicting theories of exchange value: the labor theory (that commodity
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Labor power is the potential to transform material things into new use values, while labor is the
actualization of such a capacity (Marx, Capital Vol. I, 283).
Marx, Capital Vol. I, 284, 325.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1133a19-26; Haney, 47.
Aristotle, Politics VII.i 1323b7-9; Haney, 47; Gordon, 11.
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prices are determined by the amount of labor necessary to produce them) and the utility
theory (that commodity prices are determined by consumer demand on the market).66 While
Marx (as the paradigmatic labor theorist) adopts the former theory, he argues that the
ubiquity of slave labor in antiquity blinded Aristotle to the fact that exchange value is
ultimately determined not by consumer demand but by socially necessary labor.67
For both Aristotle and marxist feminism, the economic concept of “value” must
ultimately—however indirectly—refer to use value.68 Unlike the modern capitalist
economic system, the ancient Athenian economy described and prescribed by Aristotle was
powered by the production, distribution, and consumption of concrete use values rather
than abstract exchange values.69 Accordingly, Aristotle’s economic thought subordinates
exchange value to use value: the former is valuable only as a means to justly re-distribute
the latter to a consumer.70 While such normative approaches to economic issues were
hegemonic for millenia, the rise of capitalism and the value-neutral rhetoric of bourgeois
political economy have suppressed the axiological depth of market phenomena.
However, the marxist tradition (echoing Aristotle) has insisted that primary
economic functions possess not only descriptive but also normative aspects. Exploitation
corrupts every phase of the economic cycle: production, consumption, and distribution (of
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Gordon, 115.
Marx, Capital Vol. I, 151-2.
This means that exchange value is derivative: the financial attempt to reify it inevitably results in
speculative bubbles and crashes.
Gallagher, 9-11.
Aristotle denounces all interest-bearing investment as usury, which ‘unnaturally’ treats money as
the end of an exchange rather than as the means of exchange (Aristotle, Politics, I.x 1258b2-7;
Marx, Capital Vol. I, 267). This is one instance of a more general Aristotelian principle: “Of
everything which we possess there are two uses: both belong to the thing as such, but not in the
same manner, for one is the proper, and the other the improper use of it” (Aristotle, Politics I.ix
1257a8-10).
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which exchange is a type). Aristotle could not foresee the way that capitalism would
reprogram the logic of production according to the marketplace language of exchange
value. However, it would be wrong to conclude that Aristotle’s work therefore lacks any
insight into the structural constants of how value functions within a class society. Indeed,
Aristotle can be read as articulating an exploitative mode of production—patriarchal
slavery—which produces a surplus consisting primarily of use values rather than of
exchange values. Because marxist feminism (via Marx) employs these concepts in its
critique of patriarchal capitalism, it will be helpful to understand how use value and
exchange value function concretely in Aristotle’s classist, patriarchal lifeworld.

1.6 Home Economics in the Ancient Oikos
Under late capitalism, the term “economics” tends to signify unlimited (and, for
Aristotle, unethical) profiteering through trading commodities which have abstract
exchange values.71 While ancient Greek society certainly had markets, the dominant mode
of production was not governed by labor market exchanges but rather by patriarchal
slavery.72 Accordingly, the term “economics” is etymologically derived from oikonomia,
the ancient Greek term for “household management.”73
Oikonomia concerns the acquisition, production, and stewardship of goods and
services with concrete use values within a hierarchical household, or oikos.74 In ancient
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Athenian society, production and distribution were so deeply embedded in another social
institution—the patriarchal family—that their domain could not be properly called an
“economy” (in the modern disembedded sense of a reified, independent social institution
called “the market”). Instead, economic functions were almost entirely embedded within
this other domain: the oikos. Because such economies were functionally undifferentiated
from family life, some recent social theorists hold that Aristotle and his peers do not think to
conceptualize or explain it independently (at least not in any way which is significant by
modern standards).75 This interpretation provides additional historical support for SRT,
which contends that even the disembedded economy constituting late-stage capitalism
cannot divorce reproduction from production.
In inviting marxist feminists to revisit the ancient oikos, my intention is not to
re-center the household as an economic unit of analysis; instead, I seek to analyze it as a
microcosmic class economy which conditions (sub)class interests according to a particular
mode of production and a particular mode of value-distribution. The ancient oikos displays
all the socio-economic components of gendered class formation, sub-class antagonism, and
mediated exploitation required for the application of SRT. (Moreover, because this
oikonomic slave society has a class of social reproductive laborers who are not necessarily
gendered feminine, this case can demonstrate how patriarchy is not necessarily coextensive
with social reproduction).
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supply of men’s everyday wants” (Aristotle, Politics, 1252b13-14).
These include Karl Marx, Hannah Arendt, M.I. Finley, Joseph Schumpeter, and Karl Polanyi
(Booth, 6-7).
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As Aristotle explains in Book I of Politics, the archetypal Athenian oikos is a
hierarchical household whose members include a husband, father, and master (or
‘patriarch’, for simplicity’s sake), his wife, his slaves, and his children.76 Atop the chain of
command, this free male patriarch serves multiple social roles—as citizen, as husband, as
slave-master, and as father.77 His wife (whom Engels calls the “chief housemaid”) serves as
the second-in-command over their slaves, who perform the majority of productive and
reproductive work.78
As an empirical theorist, Aristotle develops his account of slavery (as of all other
phenomena) based on his observations of the world as he finds it, which in ancient Athens
is permeated with unfree labor.79 His society prospers on the backs of slaves, many of
whom serve craftsmen or the city-state, but some of whom serve private households.80
Because the ancient oikos is a unit of production, and most of its constituent laborers are
slaves, their work is undoubtedly productive of surplus use value. However, slaves also
perform social reproductive labor in order to replenish not only their own labor power, but
also that of the wife in her productive function as household manager.81
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Aristotle writes that “the first and fewest possible parts of a family are master and slave, husband
and wife, father and children” (Aristotle, Politics I.iii 1253b5-6). It should be noted that although
slaves and even wives were often purchased by the patriarch, the exchange value of this initial
‘investment’ pales in comparison to the surplus value extracted from their labor.
Aristotle, Politics I.iii 1253b1-11.
Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, 738. When Aristotle writes of
women in the oikos, he is referring primarily to the free (i.e. not enslaved) wife of the patriarch,
because “nature has distinguished between the female and the slave” (Aristotle, Politics I.ii
1252b1). Of course, this ‘free woman has multiple social roles: she is often also a mother, sister,
and daughter. However, it is her role as housewife which is most economically significant.
Accordingly, I will refer to her socio-economic positionality as ‘wife.’
Schofield, 11; Millett, 193.
Ambler, 391-3. Aristotle would be the first to remark that the ideal types in his economic theory
are not necessarily accurate descriptions of historical Athenian society, since there are always
exceptions to the rule of nature (Politics I.xii 1259b2-3, I.vi 1255b2-3).
Other marxists may take issue with this characterization of managers as producers of value. I
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In Aristotle’s philosophical anthropology, the free wife—unlike the slave—has not
only the capacity to be ruled, but also to rule (at least to some degree). Although she is
exploited and oppressed by her patriarchal husband, she is nonetheless the superior of her
slaves. For Aristotle, it is the wife’s capacity for practical reason (shared by all rulers)
which allows her to organize her subordinates, because she understands how to
wholistically coordinate all the ‘moving parts’ into a functional system.82 Despite also
possessing such intellectual capacity, the patriarch himself does not engage in such rational
central planning: instead, he authorizes his wife to oversee household activities and
production in his stead.83 The wife is functionally in charge of the household much of the
time while her husband is gone engaging in public affairs. While Aristotle depicts the
patriarch as the household’s provider, this is only in a formal sense: his “provision” amounts
to private property rights (secured via trade or conquest) over resources which generate
surplus use value through the production process performed by his household’s workers.84
Hannah Arendt depicts the ancient Athenian aristocracy as scorning labor as it
represents necessity, which is the antithesis of freedom.85 Even physical proximity to
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respond that insofar as managerial oversight is a necessary function of the production process, it
contributes to the stock of created value. This fact can be seen more easily if the oppressive
conditions of domination are removed: in a worker-owned cooperative, management does not
disappear—instead, the workers must manage themselves.
Aristotle, Politics I.xiii 1260b12-14; Millett, 187.
Aristotle claims that free men have rationality with authority, while free women have rationality
but lack authority (Aristotle, Politics I.xiii 1260a9-14). While this last property is ambiguous, it is
clear that, as household manager, the wife exercises power derived from the patriarch (Stauffer,
937; Saxonhouse, 74).
Aristotle, Politics I.viii 1256a10-11. Although it is anachronistic to redescribe the Aristotelian
oikos with marxist terminology (or even the language of bourgeois economics), I believe that it is
conceptually warranted because of Aristotle’s intellectual impact on such discourse in the first
place.
Arendt, 12, 81. Finley notes that while all citizens were free (i.e. not slaves), not all freemen were
citizens. For example, certain male laborers were considered free, yet not citizens (Finley [1982],
122). Additionally, although no women were citizens, some women were understood to be
free—namely, the wives of property-owning citizens (F.A. Wright, 212).
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necessitarian labor is seen as tainting the patriarch’s liberty; therefore it is regarded as
unnatural for masters to be relationally close to their slaves.86 Accordingly Aristotle argues
that a managerial wife should mediate between her husband and the slave to avoid
contaminating the former’s ability to freely leave the oikos to participate in the public life of
the polis.87
For Aristotle, leisure is a necessary but insufficient condition for eudaimonia: the
good life of human flourishing.88 Technically speaking, anyone who is not enslaved—
craftsman, merchant, even housewife—is free; yet only the ruling class of citizen patriarchs
are empowered to enjoy their freedom leisurely.89 Unlike the modern conception of leisure
(which associates free time ‘off the clock’ with one’s private life at home), leisure in the
ancient world is expressly a function which can only be fulfilled outside of the home.90
Aristotle writes that the teleological good life of a privileged minority (viz. free male
citizens) involves contemplating scientific and philosophical truths (theoria) or applying
practical wisdom (phronesis) in deliberation about political decisions.91 But the patriarch’s
leisurely freedom is only made possible by the exploitation of the other household
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Millett, 206-7.
While Aristotle’s prescriptions for the relational proximity between master and slave are
occasionally inconsistent, he repeatedly counsels every patriarch to deputize his wife to rule in
his stead, whether the patriarch is present or not (Aristotle, Politics I.xii 1259b2-8, I.xiii 1260a401260b8, II.v 1264b2, III.iv 1277a5-7, III.iv 1277b24-26; Millett, 204).
Aristotle, Politics VII.xv 1334a18-36; Booth, 27.
Booth, 33.
Owens, 716. Throughout his corpus, Aristotle vacillates in his view of eudaimonia (available
only to the patriarch): while he explicitly privileges intellectual contemplation (theoria) as the
telos of the fully human life, his virtue ethics implies the contrary position that eudaimonia
involves of a certain type of action (praxis)—namely, exercising the virtue of practical wisdom
(phronesis) (Adkins, 311-312).
Aristotle writes, “[T]hose who are in a position which places them above toil have stewards who
attend to their households while they occupy themselves with philosophy or with politics”
(Aristotle, Politics I.vii 1255b34-36).
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members.92 For these wives and slaves (and all other non-citizen persons), the telos of life is
to excellently perform the social roles of production or social reproduction, in order to
provide for the patriarch’s basic needs (shelter, clothing, food, water, and above all free
time) so that he can enjoy such leisure and the consumption of use values which it
necessitates.

1.7 Modes of Consumption
In our modern capitalist system, the economic term “consumption” does not
necessarily refer to the tangible use of goods and services, but merely to the commodified
demand for them on a market. And the fact-value distinction presupposed by liberal
ideology removes nearly all normative conditions from consumer desire and market
demand. However, Aristotle (similarly to marxist feminists) rejects the value-neutrality of
consumption, particularly when considering wealth.93 The clearest criterion for discerning
what constitutes vicious excess as opposed to virtuous moderation in the ownership of
wealth is whether and how it is used.94 Aristotle’s teleological emphasis on the normative
dimension of use values can illuminate the (sub)division of labor and the constitution of
subclasses within the oikos. Unlike bourgeois economics, Aristotle’s proto-economic
account of (re)production and consumption is inherently normative (however classist and
sexist those norms may be).95 Therefore, I propose that it can offer conceptual clarification
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Booth, 31.
Aristotle writes that “the things that have a use may be used either well or badly; and riches is a
useful thing” (Nicomachean Ethics IV.i 1120a4-5).
Aristotle frames distributive surplus—which possibilizes either useless hoarding or excessive
consumption—according to an ethical schema in which virtue is a mean between extremes
(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IV.i 1119b25-26).
Because Aristotle borrows his values uncritically from the hegemonic ideology of his patriarchal
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to the marxist feminist SRT project which faces the problem of mediated exploitation and
the division of interests.
In the ancient ‘oikonomic’ system, consumption has a much more concrete
meaning, because most production is intended not for profitable sale but rather for
immediate use in fulfilling some need or want. Yet the consumption of a use value can look
vastly different depending on the class positionalities of the consumers, each of whom are
teleologically differentiated from the others. Although the patriarch, the wife, and the slave
may all consume the same oikos-produced goods or services (e.g. a meal), there are three
different latent use values which are called forth by the different needs of each person. The
patriarch consumes these products in the mode of leisurely freedom. By contrast, the slave
and the wife consume them in the mode of necessitarian labor, in order to provide their own
distinct services to the household.
For a historical materialist theory such as marxist feminism, it may seem as though
the motives or goals of economic agents are irrelevant factors in determining whether or not
they exploit other agents. After all, for vulgar marxism, all that matters are socio-material
conditions, not psychological ones.96 However, even in marxism, the evaluation of labor as
exploitative presupposes that one is forced to produce surplus value (whether as use value
or as exchange value) which does not benefit one’s self. At least part of this surplus is
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and slavery-based society, it is impossible for him to imagine marxist feminism’s ideal social
order in which necessary labor is both minimized and equitably distributed. This is most clearly
demonstrated in his dismissal of the prospect of a fully automated classless economy as utopian:
“if every instrument could accomplish its own work… the shuttle would weave and the plectrum
touch the lyre, [and] chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves” (Aristotle,
Politics I.iv 1253b34-1254a3).
There are often class traitors on both sides of a class war whose subjective commitments
contradict their own objective interests. For example, Engels was a factory owner who used his
wealth to fund the revolutionary socialist movement.
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extracted by the ruling class in order to provide for their (and their managers’) necessary
means of subsistence. The teleological purpose of the worker’s labor is to help eliminate the
need for the ruling class to labor. This means that the worker’s telos is really an
instrumental and subordinate purpose—a means to another’s end. For Aristotle as well as
for marxist feminists, the ultimate purpose of necessary labor must ultimately be freedom
(or liberation), conceived as a substantive notion of flourishing. So the real question is: who
exactly enjoys the freedom made possible by the worker’s necessary labors?
In the Aristotelian economic model, the aristocratic wife enjoys certain rights and
freedoms (like her husband and unlike her slave). However, these largely take the form of
her privileged duty to oppressively oversee the slave. She is similarly confined to this
private worksite, deliberately walled off from public life because, Aristotle insists, her
capacity to reason is “without authority” (akuron) and she herself must also be supervised.97
Unlike her enslaved subordinates, she is ‘free’... but only insofar as she is not herself
enslaved.98 She is not socially enabled to autonomously live the good life (eudaimonia).99
Instead, her privileges are wasted. Rather than consuming use-values produced by the slave
to enable her own freedom, she consumes them merely to enable her own exploitation. She
in turn labors to ensure that the entire oikos fulfills its purpose, which is to enable the
patriarch—liberated from the realm of necessity—to live a public life of freely developing
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Aristotle, Politics I.xiii 1260a10-14. One interpretation takes this notion of akuron to be an
internal psychological weakness. However, another takes it to be an external social constraint,
which is not only in line with reality but also with Aristotle’s account of the wife’s ability to
rationally coordinate household activities (Levy, 415)
Karbowski, 326.
Aristotle defines eudaimonia as consisting of “complete excellence” (Aristotle, Nicomachean
Ethics I.xiii 1102a5-6). Unfortunately, as Inglis argues, Aristotle limits the wife to possessing only
an “approximation of paradigmatic virtue” (Inglis, 186). Therefore, she is also prevented (in
theory or in practice) from access to the good life.
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his own potential.100 For the wife (as for the slave), the final cause (telos) of her household
role—her life’s meaning—is reduced to effectively producing household use values,
thereby reproducing her society’s mode of production. Although Aristotle describes these
economic conditions as ethically ideal and socially harmonious, this depiction takes on very
dark tones when viewed instead through marxist theory. Under exploitative and thus
alienating working conditions, such workers atrophy in body and mind, and their creative
potential fails to “develop freely.”101
Extracted surplus value—whether it is the direct service of slaves and wives or the
profits indirectly stolen from wage workers—is potential use value. And this potential is not
only denied to super-exploited social reproductive laborers; it is also denied to aristocratic
productive workers. Accordingly, while a privileged worker necessarily acts as an efficient
cause in value extraction, she does not ultimately share in its final cause. Neither the wife
nor the slave are recognized as having the teleological potential for the good life of
liberation beyond necessity. Thus, it is possible that the real interests of the labor aristocracy
may align with those of the super-exploited rather than with the ruling class.

1.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have engaged Social Reproduction Theory in a dialogue with a
problematic but important influence from economic history: Aristotle. I have presented his
articulation of the key concepts of use value and exchange value and his theory of the class
structure and economic function of the hierarchical oikos. I have argued that Aristotle’s
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Aristotle, Politics VII.xv 1334a36-39.
Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 74.
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insights constitute a simplified model of the complexly unified system of sexism and
classism theorized by marxist feminist social reproduction theory.
I have also noted how the most recent works of SRT bridges the gap between two
earlier schools of marxist feminism. The first, Dual Systems Theory, stresses how the
gendered (and raced) division of labor is caused by independent yet intersecting vectors of
oppression and exploitation which call for distinct liberation struggles to avoid sexist class
reductionism. The second school, Unitary Systems Theory, stresses how this situation is
caused by an overarching pattern of class-based exploitation which is always-already
internally subdivided according to a division of labor which reproduces special
oppressions, and calls for a coalitional class-first strategy. However, even though 21st
century SRT has drawn from both schools to develop a socio-economic model which
foregrounds feminism, anti-racism, and other progressive movements in terms of the
classed division of labor, this materialist approach to intersectionality entails the conceptual
impossibility of solidarity across varying strata of the working class. Even though SRT
proponents disprove this fragmentation problem in their rhetoric and their political praxis,
their theory itself appears unequipped to address the mediated exploitation of a putative
labor aristocracy (whatever its gendered or racialized characteristics).
In order to better understand the structural constants of exploitation (particularly the
causal culpability of an intermediary worker in a chain of value extraction), I considered the
function of the privileged strata of the working class—the managerial housewives—in the
ancient mode of production: patriarchal slavery. Although, for obvious reasons, marxist
feminist SRT focuses on contemporary capitalism (as did Marx himself in his magnum
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opus Capital), its research programme is robust enough to critique exploitation in every
mode of production, globally and historically. I have demonstrated that SRT can be applied
to the ancient socio-economic system in order to understand who is—and who is
not—responsible for the extraction of surplus value.
The example of Aristotle’s ‘oikonomic’ wife demonstrates that it is possible for a
privileged worker (among the ‘labor aristocracy’) to depend on another worker’s unpaid
social reproductive labor without intermediately exploiting them (in the technical sense).
Even though the wife oppressively dominates her slave, strictly speaking it is the ruling
class patriarch who indirectly exploits the subordinate social reproductive worker as well as
the intermediate labor aristocrat. This nuance is significant because it possibilizes solidarity
between the reproductive lower working class with the productive upper working class. By
recognizing their joint opposition to the ruling class, these different socio-economic tiers
can share radical aspirations to systemically transform the exploitative structures which
constitute the material basis of patriarchal oppression.
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CHAPTER 2. THE DIALECTICAL VIRTUES (AND VICES)
OF SOCIAL REPRODUCTIVE CARE WORK

2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will consider the contradictory dimensions of interpersonal ethics
and social ethics. I will propose that marxist feminism requires a dialectical ethics which
connects short-term and micro-scale interpersonal norms with long-term and macro-scale
social imperatives. I will take up the analysis of care work by social reproduction theory
(SRT) in order to show how its ethically ambiguous nature exemplifies a more general
problem for marxist feminism in reconciling interpersonal and social normativities.
As a type of marxist feminism, SRT provides a clear social ethic (condemning systemic
exploitation, particularly of the most vulnerable workers). Yet its theorists (like marxists
generally) require a clearer articulation of normative ethical theory at the (inter)personal
scale.102 Of course, marxist feminist Simone de Beauvoir penned the philosophical classic
The Ethics of Ambiguity at the height of French existentialism.103 However, her meta-ethical
insights into relativism and existentialism do not readily translate into the discourse of
normative ethics, which remains an open question for marxist feminism. An adequate
personal ethics for social reproduction theory and praxis must be dialectical in nature,
addressing the tension between these values of immediate interpersonal care and those of
strategic social justice (oriented toward a “communist horizon”).104
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This parallels Lise Vogel’s insistence that feminists who have demonstrated excellence in their
political praxis still require the deeper theoretical grounding which marxism provides (Vogel, 32).
de Beauvoir (1948), 10.
Dean (2012), 2.
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I argue that deontological and contractualist theories are insufficient for this role of
dialectical ethics because their reliance on rights and universalizability are too static and
individualistic for marxist feminism’s historical materialist methodology. Utilitarian theories
are also insufficient because they can justify the sacrifice of the interests of vulnerable
minorities (e.g. working-class women of color) for the interests of privileged majorities (e.g.
the white male labor aristocracy). This leaves marxist feminists with two possible normative
ethical theories: feminist care ethics and virtue ethics (Aristotelian or otherwise). I will
ultimately argue that virtue ethics—specifically, a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic revised by
feminist care ethics—is the best candidate for a marxist feminist dialectical ethic. I will
ultimately demonstrate this by applying it to the moral imperatives which would be faced
by a care worker who has been radicalized by marxist feminism.

2.2 Dialectical Ethics: Between (Inter)Personal Ethics and Social Ethics
Marxist feminism is the theory and praxis which, according to the Black communist
revolutionary Claudia Jones, holds that “the inequality of women is inherently connected
with the exploitation of the working class.”105 However, its normative discourse typically
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Jones, 4. This intersectional approach is often positioned as a new development in feminism’s
third wave, following the struggle for rights of “formal equality” in the first wave and the struggle
for material rights (concerning labor and sexuality) in the second wave (Vogel, 3). However, there
were already marxist feminists in the early 20th century fighting these struggles in the 2nd and
3rd Communist Internationals, but they tend to be written out of the ‘feminist waves’ narrative.
This call to redistribute social reproduction is hardly new—it is the same demand made over a
century ago by marxist feminists Clara Zetkin, Alexandra Kollontai, and Rosa Luxemburg in the
communist Second International (Smith, 1). Unfortunately, this tradition has been ignored by
even the most socialist of major FCE theorists, Joan Tronto ([1993], 176).
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gets framed as political and not as ethical.106 It remains to be seen what marxist feminists
want in a strictly moral theory.107
The branch of moral philosophy concerned with issuing imperatives (based on a
criterion for right and wrong in reference to the good and the bad) is known as normative
ethics.108 Its injunctions are often addressed to a single individual moral agent. This
subfield, known as personal ethics (or individual ethics), is difficult to reconcile its
counterpart social ethics.109 Social ethical theories (such as marxist feminism) are often
classified disciplinarily within sociology rather than moral philosophy, because the
methodological individualism of much ethical discourse presupposes a degree of personal
agency which marxism’s structural analysis is reticent to acknowledge.110 Although modern
liberalism has attempted to institute a rigid divide between the individual and interpersonal
level of ethics and the social level of politics, other political theorists—from Aristotle to
Marx—have viewed them as shading into each other.111
While marxist feminism clearly has a social ethic, its corollary personal ethic is
much less clear.112 Marxist feminists implicitly uphold the values of liberation, autonomy,
equality, and equity, and they condemn oppression, exploitation, domination, and
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Dalla Costa and James, 47-8.
This echoes Annette Baier’s famous essay “What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory?” She
insists that a sufficiently feminist ethics must incorporate yet exceed the contributions of prior
male theorists (Baier, 266). I hope to expand this question to account for class.
Following Hegel, de Beauvoir claims that normative ethics exists only as long as is differs from
ought; the entire goal of ethics is to close this gap and therefore dissolve normative potentiality
into one’s actual state of being (de Beauvoir [1948], 10-11).
Armstrong, 119-20.
Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, 144.
Tronto [1993], 6-7; Fraser and Honneth, 4; Fraser, 33; Groff, 314.
Recent feminist ethicits have been deliberately connecting the gap between personal and social
ethics; however, this continues to remain an open question for specifically marxist feminists
(Dillon, 378).
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alienation.113 Accordingly, they demand the historical transformation of the social structures
of production, reproduction, socialisation, and sexuality.114 This communist horizon must
necessarily involve women’s liberation, yet its details cannot be determined in advance
without impeding the process with static ideals.115 Nonetheless, a marxist feminist personal
ethic must orient its norms to this ultimate yet unclear end. In so doing, it must also resolve
several additional philosophical contradictions.
First, a dialectical ethic must be objectivist enough to ground a universal call to
social liberation, yet relativist enough to account for different moral situations involving
individuals and groups of varying positionalities (according to class, race, gender, sexuality,
etc.).116 Second, it must avoid the fatalism of social determinism without succumbing to a
metaphysical libertarianism which is individualistic and voluntaristic—in a word,
bourgeois.117 Third, its liberatory strategy must avoid the idealist expectation that moral
agents (i.e. political subjects) can be consistently motivated by rational principles rather
than embodied affects, even as its particular version of consequentialism must seek to
produce a more logical social order where fear-based heteronomy is transformed into a
naturally communistic impulse.118 Fourthly, it must neither demand endlessly self-sacrificial
altruism from its subaltern moral agents, nor permit the selfish egoism of crude anarchism.
A marxist feminist ethic must resolve these contradictions in historical materialist terms.
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Its primary opponents are imperialists, capitalists, fascists, and patriarchal reactionaries, whose
ideologies have often been internalized by working class men (Jones, 4-5).
Mitchell, 43.
de Beauvoir (1948), 153; Mitchell, 54.
Leon Trotsky writes that “elementary moral precepts exist... but the extent of their action is
extremely limited and unstable. Norms ‘obligatory upon all’ become the less forceful the sharper
the character assumed by the class struggle” (Trotsky, 165).
Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 595.
Engels, Anti-Dühring, 726.
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Such a methodology is known as dialectics: the dynamic by which unstable structures
work out their internal contradictions over time.119 In order to judge which normative
theory is most suitable as a dialectic ethic, I will compare how each applies to the particular
case study of social reproductive care work.

2.3 Case Study: Social Reproductive Care Work
In order to determine the normative ethical theory that is most coherent with the
marxist feminist project, it will be helpful to identify a particular subject as a moral agent.
The moral agent with whom marxist feminists concern themselves must also be a politically
revolutionary subject.120 There are many candidates for the revolutionary subject beyond
“working class” (which has often strangely been coded as cisheteronormative, white, and
male): women, racial subalterns, queers, etc.121 One of the most promising figures is the
social reproductive care worker, whose ‘super-exploitative’ socio-economic role is laden
with intersecting identitarian oppressions.122 Following social reproduction theory, I will
take as my case study a working class woman (i.e. someone who faces both structural
oppression and structural exploitation) who performs care work. Perhaps this moral agent is
also disabled, queer, and a woman of color, though for simplicity’s sake what is
conceptually significant is her economic role as a social reproductive care worker.123
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McNally, 103-4; Bhattacharya, 4.
Sargent, xxi; Federici, 7.
Bhattacharya, 68. Following in the footsteps of Black marxist feminists like Lucy Parsons,
Claudia Jones, and Angela Davis, the Combahee River Collective has called for a revolutionary
socialist movement which is “particularly committed to working on those struggles in which race,
sex, and class are simultaneous factors in oppression” (Combahee River Collective, 26).
Federici, 7. According to Tronto, “In most societies, care work is distributed by gender, by caste
and class, and often, by race and ethnicity as well.” (Tronto [1993], x).
McNally, 109.
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Care work is the paradigmatic type of social reproductive labor and thus a useful
point of comparison for marxist feminists considering different normative ethical
theories.124 It can be defined as physical or emotional labor which provides direct service to
others in order to decrease their pain or increase their pleasure, or to supplement their
disability or increase their capacity. Social reproductive labor—the often unremunerated
replenishment of labor power—is the paradigm case of care work for marxist feminist
inquiry.125
Because the subject of marxist feminism is the working class woman, the primary
(though not only) social context of her oppression and exploitation throughout much of
global history is in the domestic sphere: this often extends beyond her own housework to
performing domestic labor for another.126 However, even though these nearly universal
patterns have produced a gendered (and often racialized) class in-itself, it remains to be seen
whether this demographic can become a gendered racialized class for-itself.127 Marxist
feminists have hoped that feminized care workers can move from passively experiencing
oppression in isolation and exploitation to actively and collectively working against
patriarchal capitalism as revolutionary subjects.128 It is clear that each social reproductive
laborer (hereafter “care worker”) is a moral patient who experiences the immoral actions
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Dalla Costa and James, 54.
Fraser, 23. Combining class struggle with the women’s liberation movement, SRT was developed
in the 1970s and 1980s by marxist feminists such as Silvia Federici, Mariarosa Dalla Costa, Selma
James, Christine Delphy, and Lise Vogel. It has undergone a recent resurgence by theorists and
activists such as Nancy Fraser, Susan Ferguson, Tithi Bhattacharya, Cinzia Arruzza, and Kathi
Weeks. SRT examines service institutions whose end product is the labor power of workers
themselves, for example: hospitals, schools, restaurants, and especially families.
de Beauvoir (1952), 113-14.
Dalla Costa and James, 58. This is a refinement of Marx’s original formulation of class
consciousness, which mostly ignores the gendered and racialized contours of the working class
(Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, 218).
Federici, 60.
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by others within the oppressive and exploitative conditions of a patriarchal class structure;
the manifold wrongs against her are obvious. However, such a care worker is also a moral
agent.129 The particular form of moral agency which is most relevant to marxist feminists is
the revolutionary potential of a subject who becomes ethically bound to a particular
political project. Marxist theorist Louis Althusser refers to the process whereby such an
individual is ‘subjectified’ as interpellation.130
The first obstacle keeping a care worker from becoming a revolutionary subject is
ideological false consciousness: she has already been interpellated as an acquiescent subject
by the patriarchal capitalist system. Marxist theory suggests that many workers wrongly
identify their interests with those of their exploiters.131 Such a care worker may be working
against her will, and suppressing her own self-interested values and feelings. And even
when the care worker does not suffer subjectively from ideological false consciousness, her
acquiescence to abusive working conditions can help to reinforce oppressive social
patterns. A marxist feminist moral theory must reckon with these problematic dynamics,
especially in light of the fact that many women are already interpellated as care workers.
Such a dialectical ethic must be able to sift through their existing attitudes and skills
(cultivated through their care work), affirming those tendencies which are liberatory while
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Dalla Costa and James, 56, 59.
Althusser explains that “ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way as to ‘recruit’ subjects among
individuals (it recruits them all) or ‘transform’ individuals into subjects (it transforms them all)
through the very precise operation that we call interpellation or hailing… ‘Hey, you there!’”
(Althusser, 190).
Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 154. This phenomenon is not necessarily irrational, but a
rational calculation of which alliance (along the axis of class, race, or gender) has the highest
probability of serving one’s own interests (Ferguson and Folbre, 333). The danger of an
agency-erasing paternalistic critique can be mitigated by temporalizing conflicting interests: one
may be aware of their long-term interests even as they pursue compromised short-term interests.
Accordingly, marxist feminist strategy must mediate between short- and long-term goals (Federici,
55).
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rejecting those which are reactionary. Unfortunately, the two primary normative
theories—deontology and utilitarianism—are unable to interpellate moral agents into
liberatory struggle as political subjects, because these theoretical lenses are themselves at
least partially veiled by false consciousness.

2.4 Deontology and Utilitarianism
Several normative theories immediately reveal themselves to be untenable for
marxist feminism: those which feminist care ethics refers to as justice ethics. Contractualist
approaches (such as Kantian and Rawlsian deontological theories) are too formalist and
universalist to adequately interpellate the individuals situated within the social systems of
patriarchy and capitalism as political subjects.132 Even though marxist feminists may use the
language of “women’s rights” or “worker’s rights”, the deontological framework of rights
and correlative duties has traditionally been associated primarily with property rights, which
have been systematically denied to women, BIPOC, and the working class for millenia in
the West.133 Whatever normative rights and duties may eventually obtain in a ‘kingdom of
ends’, they are at best utopian abstractions (and at worst ideological mystifications) if one
does not historicize their injunctions to the current moment’s social conditions.134
As a historical materialist theory, marxist feminism must therefore embrace some
form of consequentialist ethics in order to make such ‘rights’ substantively available to all
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However, Blackledge admits that “to the extent that Marxists articulate ethical critiques of
capitalism they tend to revert to one or other form of modern bourgeois morality: typically either
consequentialism or deontology.” (Blackledge, 41).
Bhattacharya, 69. As Carole Pateman and Charles Mills point out, the idea of a ‘voluntary
contract’ within a racist patriarchal class system is a farce, because power dynamics skew the
voluntariness of the parties’ consent to the terms of agreement (Pateman and Mills, 2, 7).
Brenkert, 428.
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subalterns.135 The most popular version of consequentialism is utilitarianism, but marxist
feminists also face several problems with this model of the right and the good. The
qualitative objection of utilitarianism is that the desires of individuals of different classes or
identity groups should not be weighted equally; there should be a preference for the needs
of the oppressed.136 The quantitative objection is that utilitarian theories are too majoritarian
to adequately protect the rights of minorities (in the literal sense of a quantitative subset
constituting less than 50% of the whole population). Even though the workers in a class
society compose the vast majority of people, approximately half of them are women or
non-binary workers. This fraction drops further into minority status upon specifying
‘working class women of color.’ It clearly seems wrong to sacrifice subaltern interests for
the greater good (i.e. the interests of males, white people, and the ruling class), yet
utilitarianism would seem to demand exactly that.137
Having ruled out deontology, contractualism, and utilitarianism, marxist feminist
dialectical ethics must look for its normative roots in either—or both—of the remaining
approaches: feminist care ethics or virtue ethics. Because SRT is a feminist project
concerned with care workers, its theorists might be expected to adopt some version of
feminist care ethics (FCE).
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Communists facing difficult conditions have not only erred on the side of sacrificing means to
ends (Blackledge, 41), but also sacrificing ends to means and making a virtue of necessity (de
Beauvoir [1948], 125). Marxist feminist ethics must follow her injunction to strike “a balance
between the goal and its means” (de Beauvoir [1948], 148).
Brenkert, 433.
Arruzza, Bhattacharya, & Fraser, 13.
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2.5 Feminist Care Ethics
In the 1980s, several moral philosophers developed a new normative ethical theory
known as a feminist ethic of care, which they distinguished from what they term masculine
ethics of justice.138 Feminist care ethics aimed to resolve major problems in both utilitarian
and deontological paradigms.139 This novel normative theory’s key value of care is often in
tension with the value of justice.140 According to this schematic, marxist feminism is a
(social) justice ethic and therefore lacks robust interpersonal norms. This theoretical
deficiency can perhaps be rectified by valorizing care. However, while feminist care ethics
must inform marxist feminist SRT, it cannot alone serve as an adequate personal ethic. In
order to determine which normative theory is most dialectically appropriate for marxist
feminism, I will examine the feminized and racialized role of the care worker, who figures
prominently in both social reproduction theory (SRT) and feminist care ethics (FCE).141 In
doing so, I will close the gap in the literature separating these closely related yet
disciplinarily independent fields.
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FCE was initially sketched out by Carol Gilligan in a critique of unduly androcentric accounts of
moral development (which culminated in Kantian rationalist absolutism), which focus on the
independent self and its work—not on its relationships (Gilligan, 151, 160). Similarly, Nel
Noddings writes that whereas women’s feminized experience often results in a concrete emotional
moral approach, men’s masculine experiences tends to lead to rationally abstract moral approach
(Noddings, 8).
Noddings explicitly contrasts her FCE with the contractualist school (Noddings, 4).
Held, 15. In FCE’s schema, any moral context can be framed through either the masculinized
value of justice (i.e. universal obligation) or the feminized value of care (i.e. particularized love),
neither of which should be absolutized over the other (Gilligan, 167; Noddings, xiv, 11, 18;
Benhabib, 180; Baier, 266, 271, 273).
Just as SRT has been used to reinterpret marxism’s materialist analysis along gender and racial
lines, Maurice Hamington proposes that FCE’s attunement to the common situation of
embodiment can discern universal norms while acknowledging identitarian differences
(Hamington, 80).
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Care, as defined by FCE theorist Joan Tronto, is the “on-going responsibility and
commitment” for some other subject (or, more broadly, object).142 FCE values relationships
not merely as instrumentally good means, but also as inherently good ends.143 The
philosophical anthropology undergirding FCE assumes both that human beings
instinctively engage in “natural caring” and also that “ethical caring” must be prescribed
under conditions in which natural care is insufficient (or even impossible).144
Unfortunately, the imperative to care has often been imposed upon women
externally by patriarchal social structures, rather than internally according to their own
conscientious judgments. Sarah Ruddick argues that even though caring practices were
conditioned by millenia of women’s oppression, they nonetheless contain valuable elements
and can be repurposed by feminists.145 Joan Tronto is less sure, warning FCE not to make a
virtue of feminized caring because of its oppressive historical conditioning.146 I will
examine these complex contributions in turn, noting both their attractive and problematic
elements for marxist feminists.
First, FCE seeks to position itself between moral objectivism and relativism. It
views care both as manifesting in unique ways in different relational and social contexts,
yet it also posits care as a universal phenomenon across human societies.147 Marxist
feminist strategy requires tactical flexibility, and this is no more apparent than in an
organizer’s treatment of individuals from differently-privileged social positionalities.148
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Tronto (1989), 173.
Held, 17; Noddings, 5.
Noddings, xv. Ethical caring is thus only auxiliary to natural caring.
Ruddick, 359. Herbert Marcuse makes a very similar argument (Marcuse, 283).
Tronto (1989), 185.
Held, 3, 20.
Arruzza, 196.
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However, even if care is descriptively a universal value (found in all societies), care which
does not extend beyond the particularity of its proximate relations can justify xenophobic
attitudes toward more distant others.149 For instance, marxist feminists might lapse from
their internationalist commitments into ‘social imperialism,’ caring for subalterns
domestically in the imperial core while ignoring those in the colonial periphery. Thus, while
care may be a value among other values (such as justice), it should not be elevated above
them.150
Second, FCE attempts to avoid the extremes of both determinism and libertarianism
by highlighting both the agency of care workers and their social constraints and
compulsions. FCE valorizes actions which are performed (voluntarily or involuntarily) by
oppressed moral agents, and which are wrongly recognized only as a natural ‘given.’151
However, FCE’s affirmation of the historically feminized (and thus denigrated) practice of
care has prompted accusations that it reinforces patriarchal gender norms and consigning
women to subjugational roles.152 Critics claim that FCE mislabels relational care work as a
labor of love, thereby making a virtue of necessity.153 By assuming that care workers have
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Tronto (1989), 183. In fact, the classical definition of corruption, dating back to Aristotle, is the
privileging of private interests (relational as well as individual) over public interests.
Positioning care over and against justice degrades the value of the latter and undermines
resistance to oppression (Sander-Staudt, 27-8).
Annette Baier criticizes masculine moral theory for omitting duties to care for the young and to
perpetuate morality intergenerationally. Such androcentric liberal theories tend to amoralize
feminized care practices and take for granted conditions such as being raised by a loving
parent—which assume not merely parental duty but the parental virtue of loving care (Baier,
267-8).
Held, 12; Ruddick, 346; Groenhout, 173. Groenhout expands this point: “traits identified as
‘feminine’ are common to many people who are raised under oppressive circumstances, and are
perhaps better understood as survival mechanisms than virtues” (Groenhout, 185).
Kittay attributes this to oppressive background conditions such as poverty which “undermine the
possibility of love’s labor” (Kittay, 174).
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more agency and autonomy than may be the case, FCE risks fixing the care worker more
firmly in the grasp of social determinism which marxist feminists are trying to pry open.
Third, FCE strives to attend to moral motives (particularly acting out of a feeling of
care) as much as to consequences (particularly the ends of mutually caring relationships).154
Although FCE values natural caring (i.e. that which proceeds from instincts and affects), it
also prescribes caring in contexts where an insufficient emotional motive cannot effectively
provide for the needs of moral patients. By respecting the moral significance of emotional
affects, FCE challenges the masculine rationalism of both deontology (which absolutizes
reason) and utilitarianism (which instrumentalizes it). Even though care ethicists tend to
focus on actions over psychological states, the moral ideal is healthy relationships of mutual
care and affection. The stereotypically altruistic connotations of care also may ideologically
legitimize the economic extraction of the surplus value produced by the care worker.155
Even if she subjectively enjoys her role in the caring relation, it may be objectively
exploitative.156 The motivation of the care worker (whether love or duty) is not the only
relevant moral factor: the consequences of one’s care practices may combine with those of
others to constitute detrimental social patterns.157
Fourth, FCE attempts to deconstruct the false dichotomy between egoism and
altruism.158 Moreover, in focusing on interpersonal relationships, FCE seeks to evade the
individual-versus-society dilemma which utilitarianism and deontology have been fighting
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Held, 20.
Held, 16; McLaren, 105.
Ruddick, 354; Baier, 269-70.
Benhabib questions the moral significance of an individual “‘woman’s voice’ independent... of
race and class differences, and abstracted from social and historical context” (Benhabib, 191).
For Held, caring relations are “neither egoistic nor altruistic” (Held, 12).
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since the 19th century. By valuing care over individual rights, FCE challenges the egoistic
values motivating capitalist exchange (“the paradigmatic relationship of modern society”).
159

However, although FCE has widened its focus to include the moral role of the cared-for

as well as that of the carer, the theory still tends toward a self-denying heteronomy.160
Feminist care ethics tends to be normatively altruistic, to the point of being criticized for
valorizing self-sacrifice (especially that of female care workers) for the interests of cared-for
others.161 While marxist feminists acknowledge the importance of self-sacrifice in a
liberation struggle, altruism is a limited principle for radical organizing.162
All of these problems make FCE unsuitable for a marxist feminist ethic, along with
the other major ethical theories of deontology and utilitarianism. This leaves virtue ethics as
the final probable contender for a dialectical personal ethic which can complement the
social ethic embodied by marxist feminist politics.

2.6 Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics
I will argue that immediate interpersonal demands and long-term social demands are
connected both in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and in the works of some recent feminist
care ethicists who frame (interpersonal) care as a virtue alongside (social) justice.163 Over
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Tronto (1989), 178. FCE emphasizes the substantive value of equity (a “recognition of
differences in need”) over the formal values of liberty or equality (Gilligan, 164).
Tronto (1989), 180. Noddings describes care as “a move away from self” (Noddings, 16).
McLaren, 107. Tronto cautions other care ethicists to avoid romantically idealizing selflessness
in caregivers (Tronto [1989], 178).
This is not only because of the finitude of self-sacrifice, but also because micro-ethical
(inter)personal care does not scale up to macro-ethical social justice (Tronto [1989], 182). While
Nel Noddings gestures toward systemic thinking (calling her society to “transform...the
conditions that make caring difficult or impossible”), she is primarily interested in interpersonal
actions rather than social praxis (Noddings, xxii).
Sander-Staudt, 21.
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the past several decades, the oldest tradition of normative ethics has undergone an
intellectual renaissance, spearheaded by the theory known as neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics
(NAVE).164 Although such theorists are committed to the general structure of Aristotle’s
moral thought and regularly cite and comment upon their intellectual godfather, their
hermeneutic project has reconstructed a rather idiosyncratic Aristotle. This neo-Aristotelian
approach has at times detached the concept of character excellence from its original context
in fixed social roles, which may seem immutable from the perspective of Aristotle’s other
works (such as Politics).165 Virtue ethics is rooted in the Aristotle’s ancient culture of
patriarchy and slavery, yet 20th- and 21st-century NAVE has rightly rejected Aristotle’s
denigration of women and slaves, recontextualized his normative theory, and revised his
catalog of virtues to address the lifeworld(s) of contemporary society.166
As NAVE theorist Rosalind Hursthouse correctly predicted, this development has
increasingly merged virtue ethics with other normative theories, including feminist care
ethics.167 Several neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists have borrowed the value of care from
FCE and designated it as a virtue alongside justice, prudence, self-control, courage, etc.168 I
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Hursthouse (1999b), 2; Nussbaum, xxiv. Although there are of course many varieties of virtue
ethics (some of which have very diverse intellectual lineages, including Confucianism), Halwani
insists that Aristotle offers the only plausible version of virtue ethics (Halwani, 14). Philippa Foot
similarly argues that Aristotle’s version is the most systematic (Foot, 1). In Benhabib’s definition,
“‘neo-Aristotelianism’ refers to a hermeneutical philosophical ethics, taking as its starting point
the Aristotelian understanding of phronesis,” i.e. the cardinal virtue of practical reason
(Benhabib, 25).
Aristotle’s traditional virtue ethics focused on patriarchal virtues and ignored or denigrated
female virtues, such as care (Dillon, 381).
McLaren, 113; Sander-Staudt, 21-22; Halwani, 17-18; Snow (2015), 51; Hursthouse (1999b), 2, 8;
Dillon, 381. Groff writes that Marx himself has an implicit but underdeveloped ethical theory
which is “recognizably Aristotelian” (Groff, 325).
Hursthouse (1999b), 5; Snow (2018), 321.
Slote, 127; Sander-Staudt, 24-5. Although Aristotle does not explicitly discuss the value of care,
he dedicates the Books VIII and IX of Nicomachean Ethics to explaining the concept of
‘friendship.’ He treats this term so broadly and multifariously that FCE could translate it simply as
‘caring relationship,’ albeit one with problematic features (Halwani, 7; Groenhout, 193).
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propose that such a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics is well-positioned for marxist feminism’s
dialectical thinking.
The core of any normative theory is not its practical application but its posited
source of moral obligation. The key issue for virtue ethics is ultimately not about how one
should act (let alone how one should feel)—it is ultimately about why one should become a
certain type of person.169 Rather than focusing on rules or actions, virtue ethics attends
primarily to character states: habitual dispositions toward acting and feeling in certain ways
rather than others.170 These character states of virtue or vice are not necessarily fixed, but
can change over time. Through ‘self-work’ on one’s character, the accidental nature of
virtuous but out-of-character actions can become an essential aspect of one’s ‘second
nature.’171 Through practice, bad habits can become good habits, and unhealthy and
destructive irrational desires can become healthy, constructive, and more rational.172
Accordingly, virtue ethics stresses personal moral development more than perhaps any
other normative theory.173
Accordingly, Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics has a clear definition of the good for
human beings: it is a complete life of virtuous activity.174 Virtue ethics is fundamentally
concerned with the moral agent’s soul, which is not separable from the body but rather its
animating principle.175 The moral agent’s soul is always characterized by virtue, vice, or
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.i 1103b12-21; Anscombe, 1275; Groff, 334.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.v-vi 1106a11-15; Hursthouse (1999a), 105; Kosman, 105.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.iv 1105a18-20; Politics, VII.i 1323b30-31, Snow (2018), 334;
Burnyeat, 78.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.i 1103b7-21; Burnyeat, 86, 88.
Burnyeat, 70.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.vii 1098a16-18. Whereas utilitarianism and deontology concern
themselves with particular moments of principled action, virtue ethics concerns itself with the
entirety of one’s life (Russell, 2).
In this interpretation (contra that of Hardie), Aristotle and his NAVE successors are value monists,
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both.176 The excellent character habits called the virtues are taken to be both instrumentally
and intrinsically valuable: they are simultaneously causal means to and partially constitutive
ends of the good life.177 Aristotle refers to this condition of flourishing amid both internal
and external goods as eudaimonia.178
Of course, the exact list of virtues is disputable, as it is unclear which character
states should count as virtues and which should count as vices.179 What is relatively
consistent across the different tables of virtues, however, is the structure of what constitutes
a virtue: it is a mean between opposing vices (destructive character habits) which manifest
either as a defect (too little of a given action or passion in a given context) or an excess (too
much of either).180 Therefore, correcting one’s habits requires both knowing whether one is
predisposed toward too little or too much of a particular passion, and consciously willing
against one’s ‘natural’ impulses.181 As Aristotle counsels, “We must drag ourselves away to
the contrary extreme” and thereby “get into the intermediate state.”182 Some NAVE
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who posits a single value (or “supremely desired activity,” in Ackrill’s formulation) as the
ultimate end of human life (Ackrill, 58).
Aristotle characterizes virtues and vices not as first-order psychological faculties for passion or
action, but rather as second-order states of those psychological capacities (Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics II.v 1106a11-13).
MacIntyre (1981), 149; Snow (2018), 321; Broadie, 344. In the ‘ergon argument’, Aristotle
considers what the distinctive capacities of the human being must be (Aristotle, Nicomachean
Ethics, I.vii 1097b22-1098a19; Ackrill, 69-70). One interpretation has him positing a
combination of thought and action—practical rationality—as the uniquely and essentially
human function, as opposed to those of gods or animals (Nussbaum, xxvii; Ackrill, 70;
Groenhout, 179).
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.xii 1102a1-4; Ackrill, 64. The Greek term ‘eudaimonia’ has
often been translated as ‘happiness.’ This choice has been criticized for conveying a shallow
external end rather than a deeper internal end (Kraut [1979], 169; Ackrill, 67; ).
MacIntyre (1981), 162. Even Aristotle’s clearest presentation of his table of virtues and
corresponding vices is not exhaustive (Nicomachean Ethics, II.vii 1107a28-1108b10.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.vi 1107a2-5. Of course, the same character state can change its
nature as a virtue or as a vice as conditions change (Foot, 14, 16; Murdoch, 113).
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.ix 1109a24-1109b4; MacIntyre (1981), 190.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.ix 1109b4-5; Foot, 8, 11; Hursthouse (1999b), 107.
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theorists have described the relationship between virtue ethics and feminist care ethics in
precisely this way, proposing that a collaboration would be mutually corrective and
beneficial.183
First, NAVE has the potential to rectify the threat of subjectivism in FCE.184 For
instance, a virtuous care worker is not always actually engaged in care work (whether
active praxis or emotional pathos), but she has cultivated the virtuous character state (hexis)
with the constant desire to potentially provide the right type of care, to the right person, in
the right context, to the right degree.185 Because care work has been demanded of women
for millenia, patriarchal class societies habituate women in developing this disposition.186
While in the abstract such an altruistic character trait may be laudable, the oppressive
conditions of working-class women entail that this comes at the expense of their
opportunities to realize their undeveloped potential—to cultivate other virtues. NAVE is
able to both relativize the criterion for excellent feeling and action to the oppressive
constraints of the care worker’s specific positionality, yet also to recognize the virtues
which she has been forced to develop as objective and universalizable virtues which should
also be expected from vicious oppressors.187 NAVE thus balances elements of relativism
and with those of absolutism.
Second, NAVE has a greater potential than FCE to counter the socially
deterministic force of fixed internal and external conditions with the possibility of
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McLaren, 15; Groenhout, 172.
Ethical naturalists such as Aristotle, Hursthouse, and Foot treat the virtues as objectively good
even as they are relatively indexed to the specific nature of the moral agent and other conditions.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.vi 1106b16-24; Hursthouse (1999b), 92.
Slote, 36; Dillon, 386.
Davis, 11.
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cultivating freedom. Even though the virtuous agent’s actions are not absolutely
determined, neither are they nor absolutely free. Her will (prohairesis) is always under
compulsion—not only by external conditions, but also by the state (hexis) of her
character.188 Yet because her present character is conditioned by her past actions, it is also
possible for her to willfully transform her own hexis by acting according to her reason
(logos) until her emotions (pathē) align with her rational judgments.189 Virtue ethics
characterizes the transformation of vice into virtue not only as moral development of one’s
will, but moral development of one’s emotions and one’s intellect.190 Moral development,
for Aristotle, involves growing from a psychological state in which experiencing the right
passion and performing the right action are unlikely (if not impossible) to occur, to a state in
which their occurence becomes probable (or even necessary).191 Such a moral agent moves
from ‘incontinent; vice, to ‘continent’ vice, to virtue.192 For example, a care worker should
train herself both to enjoy and to ‘work on’ a difficult caring relationship if she knows it
will increase her ability to thrive. Conversely, she should train herself to despise and to ‘go
on strike’ from a difficult caring relationship (literally or figuratively) if she knows it will
oppressively constrain her. By attending to the dynamics of both external and internal
conditions, NAVE situates its philosophical anthropology between social determinism and
libertarianism.
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III.v 1114a32-1114b3.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI.ii 1139a22-25; Politics VII.xiv 1333a17-19.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III.v 1114a19-22; III.x 1118a24-26; Murdoch, 115; Sherman, 236.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.iv 1105b5-11; II.ix 1109a20-1109b6. Of course, one’s character
transformation can also be regressive. Character habituation is inherently dynamic, whether in the
direction of growth or of atrophy (MacIntyre [1981], 189).
Burnyeat, 86.
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Third, in theorizing both the motivating source and the consequential end of ethical
action, NAVE attends (perhaps more than other normative theories) to the complex
relationship between intellect, affect, and will.193 While virtue ethics (like other normative
theories) judges a moral agent’s behavior as right or wrong, this first-order evaluation of her
actions is superseded by its second-order evaluation about her character hexis (which has
been conditioned by her past actions and also determines her future actions). Her hexis
should be both rationally principled (insofar as she is intellectually attuned to ends and their
means) and emotionally affected (insofar as she is embodied in a material form subject to
passions and desires).194 Because of its temporal sensibility, virtue ethics appears to be
consequentialist: one’s repeated actions have the consequence of making one’s character
state either virtuous or vicious. Yet it also appears to be deontological (or perhaps simply
‘motivist’), since one’s character state is also the motive for virtuous or vicious actions.195
For instance, a moral agent who performs exploitive care work (whether waged service
labor or social reproductive labor) does so for one of two reasons: either she find the forced
labor of love intrinsically desirable (due to ideological conditions), or she fears the threat of
losing her job (i.e. her means of subsistence). Yet in consequentialist terms, the artifice of
her paid affective labor is not actually vicious: in fact it may well be virtuous, insofar as it
exhibits no more (and no less) emotional labor than necessary to achieve her ends given
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.ii 1139a17-1139b5.
Aristotle writes that “the irrational passions are thought not less human than reason is”
(Nicomachean Ethics III.i 1111b1-2).
MacIntyre (1981), 149.
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such relational coercion.196 NAVE offers a way to value motives and consequences
simultaneously.
Fourth, virtue ethics appears to be egoistic, insofar as it privileges caring for the
individual moral agent’s own soul and whether or not she receives what she needs to
flourish (physically and psychologically).197 However, unlike in crude egoism, the object of
the moral agent’s desire is not pleasure simpliciter, but rather self-transformation (which
produces higher pleasures).198 Virtue ethics is thus poised between the opposing vices of
apathetic egoism (i.e. excessive self-interest) and hyper-altruistic self-negation (i.e. deficient
self-interest).199 For NAVE, the higher self of enlightened self-interest is a relational and
social self.200 The virtuous care worker is neither asymmetrically codependent with others
nor autonomously isolated from them, but rather she is inclined to both provide and expect
the contextually appropriate type and amount of care for a given situation.201 NAVE can
offer a slight corrective to FCE’s problematic altruism in the form of elevated egoism.
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In fact, this merely continent (rather than virtuous) care is actually a necessary means to a greater
care-filled end: the virtuous care worker undoubtedly has other relationships outside of work,
possibly including dependents who call forth her care on a more consensual and affectionate
basis. In Aristotelian terms, this involves maintaining merely a friendship (i.e. relationship) of
utility rather than a friendship of pleasure or virtue (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII.iii
1156a6-1156b24; MacIntyre [1981]), 158).
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VII.xiii 1153b17-18; Halwani, 13.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X.vi 1176b25-32. Aristotle writes, “Therefore the good man
should be a lover of self (for he will both himself profit by doing noble acts, and will benefit his
fellows), but the wicked man should not; for he will hurt both himself and his neighbours,
following as he does evil passions” (Nicomachean Ethics IX.viii 1169a12-15).
Nussbaum, xviii, xxx; Mann, 204. Philippa Foot treats virtue ethics as elevated egoism, Bernard
Williams treats it as a form of altruism, and Rosalind Hursthouse describes it as a combination of
the two (Hursthouse [1999b], 169). I agree with Hursthouse, whose view entails (I propose) that
NAVE should adopt care as a virtue.
Cooper, 296. Because care ethics treats relationships as ontologically basic, some of its
Proponents have accused NAVE of being inescapably individualistic in its philosophical
anthropology (Sander-Staudt, 26). However, Aristotle views moral agents as essentially relational
and social beings (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.iii 1253a26-30, McLaren, 110). Yet even if
NAVE’s ontology is insufficiently relational, Halwani argues that NAVE need only accommodate
FCE’s ethical commitments, not its ontological ones (Halwani, 40).
McLaren, 114.
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In each of these philosophical tensions, neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics assists feminist
care ethics in balancing important but opposed principles. In the next section, I will show
how marxist feminist theory can weld the virtue of justice to the value of care. Such a
nuanced ethic will aid the marxist feminist project of (re)creating social structures which
make just care more possible and unust care less necessary.202

2.7 A Marxist Feminist ‘Virtue Ethic of Care’
It is interesting to note that the renaissance of virtue ethics and the birth of feminist
care ethics occurred simultaneously.203 It is even more significant that these developments
began in the 1980s—the last decade of the Communist threat to the capitalist order, and the
first full decade of global neoliberalism. NAVE and FCE can be seen as different ways of
resisting the Reaganite-Thatcherite individualism which has permeated what Nancy Fraser
calls the “‘postsocialist’” condition.204 I argue that the overlapping discourse of a
neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic of care (VEC), as posited by McLaren, Halwani, Groenhout,
and Mann, can prove beneficial to recently resurgent marxist feminism as manifested by the
most recent wave of social reproduction theory, particularly Bhattacharya, Fraser, and
Arruzza.
As the moral exemplar of marxist feminism, a radicalized care worker requires a
whole spectrum of virtues to flourish in her political role, some of which flow from her

202

203
204

In McLaren’s understanding, virtue ethics approaches “both care and justice as social capacities”
which require institutional support (112).
Held, 24.
Fraser and Honneth, 94. The NAVE wave inaugurated by Alasdair MacIntyre was perhaps a
belated response to (or even recapitulation of) G.E.M. Anscombe’s idiosyncratic virtue ethical
treatise several decades prior.
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work life.205 The most ready-to-hand virtue for a care worker would obviously be care,
which marxist feminists can recognize not only as a skill required for an exploitative service
job, but also as a pro-social character trait which readies one to serve others in the struggle
for liberation.206 If care work is a practice consisting of beneficial actions, then care itself is
a virtue (the balanced condition of one’s psychological potential to act beneficially).207
Anyone can engage in the act of care work, but not everyone develops the virtuous
disposition to meet another’s needs (even at one’s own expense).208 If care is a virtue, then
it is not only a means to the good life, but also an essential part of what Aristotle calls
eudaimonia and what marxists feminists call liberation or communism.209
In order to provide others with what they need and deserve, the care worker must
neither meet too few of their essential needs (i.e. the vice of neglect), nor meet too many of
their extraneous desires (i.e. the vice of overexertion).210 Yet because she is interpellated as
a marxist feminist, she recognizes that this balance is impossible to meet under the
constraints of patriarchal racialized capitalism. Accordingly, her virtue of care also requires
that she develop the complementary virtue of justice.211 Other radical virtues include
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Virtue ethicists often portray the virtues as being mutually necessary (Aristotle, Nicomachean
Ethics, VI.xiii 1144b32-33; Murdoch, 111-12; Groenhout, 183).
Mann, 201; Groenhout, 190. Just as there is no political strategy which guarantees liberation, the
virtues are only the most likely means of achieving the good life (which includes external goods).
There are no vices with a greatest probability of reliably providing the conditions of flourishing
(Hursthouse, [1999], 176).
Groenhout, 190; Noddings, 9.
Sander-Staudt, 30; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.iv 1105a18-23. Noddings describes care as “a
state of readiness” in which a moral agent ‘availabilizes’ herself to and for others (Noddings, 17,
19). Ruddick describes care as a virtue which is the actualization of the capacity of attention, the
development of which “is a discipline that requires effort and self-training” (Ruddick, 357).
MacIntyre (1981), 148; Halwani, 4, Kollontai, 230. Cooper reads Aristotle as treating friendship
in the same multivalent manner, both as a means and as an end (Cooper, 294).
Schofield, 315-16.
Rachels and Rachels, 158; Tronto (1993), 168); Noddings, 6; Sander-Staudt, 37. Held insists that
“an adequate, comprehensive moral theory will have to include the insights of both the ethics of
care and the ethics of justice… rather than that either of these can be incorporated into the other”
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practical wisdom (e.g. discerning when social conditions are or are not ripe for direct
action), courage (e.g. confronting the bosses or the riot police), and self-control (e.g.
refusing to cross picket lines for personal benefit).212 All these virtues, but especially care
and justice, require a careful balance to avoid conflicting with one another.213 Only through
a virtue ethic of care can marxist feminists dialectically reconcile relativism with absolutism,
libertarianism with determinism, motivism with consequentialism, and egoism with
altruism.
First, marxist feminists would benefit from VEC’s dialectical resolution to the
tension between absolute universality and relativistic particularity.214 Although virtue ethics
is described with the language of balance and moderation, the virtuous mean between
extremes is always contextually relative to particular subjective and objective conditions.215
These determine which feelings and actions count as virtuous and which count as vicious;
under different or changing conditions, a virtuous behavior can become vicious, and vice
versa.216 A historically-conscious attunement to concrete conditions is vital for a radicalized
care worker in discerning the helpful and harmful tendencies which her working conditions
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(Held, 16). Groenhout accordingly views FCE and NAVE as capable of correcting one another’s
deficiencies (Groenhout, 173, 187).
Kathi Weeks also treats hope as a political virtue, similar to how medieval Christian scholars
framed hope as a theological virtue by extending Aristotle’s moral schema (195).
Snow [2015], 57. Jean-Paul Sartre (the life partner of Simone de Beauvoir) famously offers an
example of this contradiction. In WWII, a student of his had faced the choice of staying home to
care for his ailing mother or of leaving her to join an anti-fascist milita. Sartre describes this
dilemma as opposing “two kinds of morality: a morality motivated by sympathy and individual
devotion, and another morality with a broader scope, but less likely to be fruitful” (Sartre, 31).
Groenhout, 186.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.vi 1106b19-23.
Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics III.vii 1115b24-1116a7; MacIntyre (1981), 154. Unlike modern
utilitarian and deontological ethicists, neo-Aristotelians insists that only the phronimos—one
with the virtue of practical reason— can decide what counts as a right (or wrong) action in a
particular context (Broadie, 352-3). The individual conditions of each moral agent determines
which practices they should take up to correct for the specific vices (some more destructive than
others) which tend to accompany their social positionality (Snow [2018], 324).
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have instilled in her. A radicalized care worker would be committed to overturning modern
patriarchy and capitalism, and she would valorize her character traits as virtues only insofar
as they make liberation more possible.217 A virtue ethic of care would ensure that she and
her subaltern peers are not alone in being called to a liberation struggle. The obligatory
force of VEC must impose on a rich white male as much as on a working class woman of
color, even if the latter is much more likely to be interpellated as a liberatory agent than the
former.218
Second, VEC resolves the marxist feminist tension between libertarianism and
determinism. On this theory, a radicalized care worker’s character state is neither absolutely
determined by their social positionality (within the system of patriarchal racialized
capitalism) nor absolutely free (to act justly or caringly in any situation). The good life also
requires certain external and internal goods which involve some degree of moral luck.219
However, this situation is precisely what the marxist feminist project is set up to transform.
The structural impacts of capitalism, patriarchy, and white supremacy make it impossible
for many people to live well—not only the oppressed who are denied external goods, but
also their oppressors who fail to develop internal goods.220 Yet marxists insist that the
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According to Dillon, a feminist ethic of character would simply redefine virtue as any liberatory
character trait and vice as any submissive characteristic (Dillon, 384).
This is not to deny the moral significance of the virtues for those not interpellated by leftist
political commitments—merely to argue that they are indispensable to (and evidence for) the
latter. Although I have focused on the moral agency of a very specific character (a female care
worker who has gained a leftist political consciousness), this exemplar represents a universal
moral situation which applies to everyone with the capacity for care and justice.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.viii 1099a32-1099b8; VII.xiii 1153b16-18; Nussbaum, xiii.
Given the historical a priori which habituates both social conditions and the moral agent’s own
character development, it is often the case that the right action is not always available to freely
make (and perhaps that the right emotions are not always available to feel) (Kosman, 113).
Moreover, social conditions can make it unlikely if not impossible to develop the fully human
virtues and thus to achieve eudaimonia (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII.viii 1150b29-1151a8;
MacIntyre [2011], 15-16).
MacIntyre (2011), 13-14; Mann, 212. As Dillon points out, the privileges of being an oppressor
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historical forces which produce seemingly deterministic systems also dialectically produce
the possibility of their demise: oppression and exploitation eventually drive some subalterns
to resist so forcefully that they liberate not only themselves but also the material and
ideological structures which reproduce social hierarchies.221
History shows that an exploited care worker can attain gender, race, and class
consciousness; such a transformation will motivate her to act according to the liberatory
demands of social justice as well as the demands of relational care. For instance, Alexandra
Kollontai was radicalized by reading Marx while mothering a newborn; Claudia Jones
became a Communist after working in a segregated laundromat, and Selma James
developed her marxist feminist views while performing domestic labor as a housewife.222
Such frustrating working conditions can accelerate a care worker’s realization of both the
structural impediments to genuine care and the imperative to join with others in bending the
arc of history toward justice. A marxist feminist VEC recognizes that any such movement
which is committed to overcoming deterministic social structures will be not able to liberate
itself through virtuous actions without cultivating durable virtuous character.
Third, a dialectical VEC seeks a balance between the motives and the intended
consequences of a moral agent’s actions.223 Motivist changes in desired ends and
consequentialist changes in strategic means affect one another. As Paul Blackledge argues,
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can at most secure external goods, and not a virtuous balance of internal goods (Dillon, 391).
Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, 483. Working class radicals strive to abolish
class as well as capitalism; Black liberationists strive to abolish race as well as white supremacy,
and feminists strive to abolish gender as well as patriarchy
James, 13. Even the occasional white male capitalist like Friedrich Engels has been radicalized by
observing and learning to detest the oppression and exploitation of others (Brown and Fee,
1248-49).
de Beauvoir (1948), 146, 148.
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socialist practices have followed the trajectory of “Marx’s implicit Aristotelianism, by
which the goods internal to working class struggles are both the means and ends of virtuous
activity.”224 As a political project which favors the action noun liberation in designating its
means and its ends, it seems that marxist feminism requires a consequentialist ethic.225
Paradoxically, however, it must also be deontologically motivist: even though marxist
feminists are willing when necessary to force their values upon reactionaries—whether by
reform or revolt—the ultimate end (and optimal means) of their struggle is a change of
“hearts and minds.”226 It is possible to retrain one’s character motivations as the desire to
liberate and the proper fear of complicitly acquiescing to injustice.227 A social movement
engaged in a liberation struggle must rely on an emotionally committed yet rationally
principled rank-and-file. Accordingly, the marxist feminist tradition demonstrates how VEC
can value both the motives and the consequences of individual and social acts as different
phases of a causal cycle.
Fourth, a dialectical VEC can help marxist feminism to avoid falsely dichotomizing
altruism and egoism. On the one hand, any socialist ethic must valorize feelings and actions
which subordinate self-interest to the common good: no one should thrive at the expense of
others (especially those oppressed by race, gender, class, etc).228 Yet on the other hand, a
marxist feminist ethic should not reinforce sexist and racist demands of obligatory altruism,
especially for a care worker who is habituated into putting other’s needs ahead of her
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Blackledge, 43.
Combahee River Collective, 23.
Kollontai, 230-31.
James, 75.
Kollontai, 230, 256.
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own.229 If the care worker develops too much of an attachment to an oppressive or
alienating caring role, she may stray into the vice of deficient self-love (or “self-care” in
modern parlance).230 This has been demonstrated by recent strikes, when teachers, nurses,
and other essential service workers have been chastised for withholding their labor because
such direct action supposedly violates the rights of their charges (patients, students, and
customers).231 Of course, striking is a form of collective self-advocacy, but when such care
workers refuse to perform their economic roles, it is often as altruistic as it is egoistic. Poor
care-working conditions lead to poor care, so by standing up for their own interests,
striking care workers also stand up for the interests of the cared-for people whom they
serve.232 It is certainly possible a care worker could perform the virtuous act of striking
without being motivated by virtue (e.g. care or justice).233 It is also possible that she could
find herself in struggle together with fellow travellers (who may have reactionary vices) to
secure life’s necessities.234 In fact, labor organizing proceeds on precisely the assumption
that less virtuous comrades are necessary to building the rank-and-file, even as the best
unions refuse to tolerate explicitly chauvinistic behavior.235 This rather Aristotelian strategy
of shared struggle will help workers’ character motives to improve as they habitually
practice just and caring actions (alongside comrades such as the exemplary radicalized care
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James, 75; Mann, 204; Noddings, xvii.
Groenhout, 194. Even Aristotle does not treat self-love and love of another as zero-sum, because
they are ideally identical: for virtuous people, “friend is another self” (Nicomachean Ethics IX.iv
1166a27-32; Biss, 125; Cooper, 280).
McAlevey, 136-37.
McAlevey, 30.
Aristotle writes that “some men are called good in respect of a state, others in respect of an
Activity” (Nicomachean Ethics VIII.v 1157b5-6).
Aristotle, Politics I.ii 1253a3-4, Nicomachean Ethics VII.iv 1157a16-19, VIII.ix 1160a9-11. In
Aristotelian terms, such a person would be considered a temporary ‘friend of utility’ rather than a
long-lasting ‘friend of virtue’ (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII.iv 1157a12-19; Biss, 126)
McAlevey, 31.
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worker).236 Accordingly, a marxist feminist VEC would follow Aristotle in distinguishing
between base egoism and elevated egoism, and in showing how moral growth can
transform the reactionism of the former into the comradeliness of the latter.237 As one
develops a more virtuous motive of solidarity, one’s classist, racist, and sexist feelings and
actions (which often correlate with selfishness under capitalism) at least begin to dissolve.
Aristotle writes that “in loving a friend, [people] love what is good for themselves.”238 A
virtue ethic of care would be able to offer marxist feminists a dialectical ethic in which
altruism and egoism need not ultimately be opposed.

2.8 Conclusion
My analysis has taken as a moral exemplar the figure of a radicalized care
worker—a feminized social reproductive laborer who has joined the liberation struggle
against racialized patriarchal capitalism. My methodology treats her not simply as a moral
patient violated by injustices, nor even as a politically revolutionary subject, but as a moral
agent. Rather than applying a normative theory to her context in order to determine her
moral obligations, I have instead taken for granted her moral imperatives imposed by the
liberation struggle in order to reverse-engineer a dialectically appropriate personal ethic. I
have concluded that the optimal corollary to marxist feminist social ethics is some form of
virtue ethics. I have proposed in particular a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic which treats care
as a cardinal virtue. However, the unequal distribution of care has limited the virtues of
oppressor and oppressed (albeit in very different ways). An equitable redistribution of the
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.i 1103a3-1103b4; (Kraut [1999], 101); Jimenez, 4.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII.iv-v 1157a12-1158a2.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII.v 1157b32; Kahn, 39; McAlevey, 207.
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gendered and racialized social reproductive labor would compel socio-economically
privileged moral agents (particularly white men) to overcome their vicious deficiency to
care for others, and would also allow oppressed and exploited moral agents (particularly
working class women of color) to relinquish their excessively caring habits. Such
redistribution of care work is not only teleologically desirable as a condition of communist
eudaimonia—it is also prefiguratively necessary as an immanent condition of marxist
feminist liberatory strategy. All marxist feminist moral agents (both in the oppressive
present and in the liberated age to come) should cultivate the virtue of justice and the virtue
of care… and the virtue of practical wisdom which alone can determine the context-specific
balance between the two.
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CHAPTER 3. WORKING TOWARD A COMMON GOOD:
ALIENATION, AUTONOMY, AND SOLIDARITY

3.1 Introduction
In my third chapter, I will present a political argument that fuses together the
economic and ethical cases I laid out in my first two chapters. As I showed, social
reproductive and productive workers both have conflicting concrete interests (especially on
the basis of gender and race), but they share an abstract interest in opposing the ruling class
whose power impedes the development of just and caring conditions (socially as well as
personally). This ambivalence demonstrates the need for a more robust concept of the
common good: the moral confluence of interests between self and others.239 I argue that
even though modern capitalist society is divided by class structures (that are hierarchically
intersected by gender and race), it need not be impossible for different classes, races, or
genders to share a common good.240 Accordingly, even though marxist feminism is a
conflict theory positing the necessity of competing interests, its dialectical goal is a social
condition of voluntary cooperation and mutual aid.241 However, the possibility of such a
common good is contingent upon the abolition of class structures and the gender and racial
hierarchies that they condition.
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Aristotle, Politics III.vi 1278b36. In defining political action between citizens with varying
interests, Arendt points out the linguistic fact that “interest” is literally “inter-est”—something
“which lies between people and therefore can relate and bind them together” (Arendt, 182).
Dalla Costa and James, 49. Claudia Jones writes that “the fight the fight for the full, economic,
political and social equality of the Negro woman is in the vital self-interest of white workers, in
the vital interest of the fight to realize equality for all women” (Jones, 3).
Marxist feminism is both a conflict theory (that assumes that in class societies, different classes
have distinct and often competing interests) and a dialectical theory insisting that the point of
class struggle (like gender liberation) is not simply to invert the hierarchical positionalities, but
to ultimately abolish them.
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Marxist feminists describe such a utopian state of affairs as communism, the ethos
of which is articulated most clearly by Karl Marx: from each according to their ability, to
each according to their need.242 Such a “cooperative society based on common ownership
of the means of production” (to use Marx’s terms)243 would not only heal alienation and
exploitation, but also the material base of patriarchy and white supremacy.244 I propose that
this communist principle is a particular vision of the common good. This concept, first
extensively theorized by Aristotle, can be defined as the social condition in which the
interests (i.e. needs and abilities) of all are served. By contrast, the condition of only the
interests of some being served is corruption. This conceptual dyad serves as Aristotle’s
principle of institutional legitimacy, gauging whether a given social structure is just or
unjust. It seems to me that the marxist feminist project relies on precisely this schema,
implicitly if not explicitly.
Of course, Aristotle undeniably constructs justifications of patriarchy and
exploitation, the bêtes noires of marxist feminism. Yet Aristotle’s hierarchical assertions are
actually misapplications of his own first principles: he invalidly draws chauvinistic
implications from his hylomorphic philosophical anthropology and his functionalist social
and political theories. I propose that Aristotle’s common good principle (which is grounded
in those presuppositions), can help marxist feminists to connect the material and moral
notions of the common good in a dialectical way, taking account of human development
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Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, 531.
Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, 529.
Benston, 13; Vogel, 2. Even Heidi Hartmann, despite rejecting marxism’s explanation and
strategy for liberation, Hartmann admits that “Socialism is in the interest of both men and
women” (Hartmann, 7).
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and the internal and external conditions which enable or impede it.245 I will argue that
marxist feminists should consider ‘expropriating’ and ‘liberating’ Aristotle’s nuanced and
dynamic theory of corruption and the common good.246
For marxist feminists as much as for Aristotle, material needs and moral
culpabilities are co-constitutive: external goods are necessary to develop internal goods, and
internal goods are necessary to secure and distribute external goods. For instance, in both
theories, the internal good of practical reason (phronesis) is necessary for ruling in the
interests of all. While Aristotle restricts citizenship to only those elite who supposedly
possess this intellectual virtue of harmonizing means and ends, marxist feminists
subversively insist that subalterns possess a more informed phronesis whose efficacy is
limited by structural oppression and exploitation. Through collective praxis, they can
empower themselves and others to create the possibility of a solidaristic common good
which serves the diverse needs and abilities of all social positionalities.

3.2 The Ideological Function of ‘Common Good’ Rhetoric
As sociological conflict theories, marxism and feminism are inherently suspicious of
“common good” discourse.247 Any purported confluence of interests might actually be
ideological cover for power relations and privilege structures.248 I argue that this is an
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Depew claims that Marx himself reads Aristotle through a historicist hermeneutic which reveals
true insights in a dialectical rather than absolute fashion (Depew, 70).
In so doing, I am not proposing an “Aristotelian marxist feminism,” but rather using Aristotelian
language to explicate the tacit commitments of marxist feminism concerning the conflict and
confluence of interests between men and non-men, the ruling class and the working class, and
whites and people of color.
Marx, “After the Revolution: Marx Debates Bakunin,” 545.
Coole, 34; Arruzza, Bhattacharya, & Fraser, 45-46; Marx and Engels, The German Ideology,
172). However, Aristotle implicitly supports this critique in claiming that “a common interest…
[which] rests merely on convention and force” is unnatural and unjust (Aristotle, Politics I.vi
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instance of what Aristotle describes as corruption, whereby a particular interest substitutes
itself for the interests of the whole.249 Class, patriarchy, and racism divide groups which
could otherwise unite in solidarity to cooperatively achieve common goals.250 In fact, ruling
class ideology (like patriarchal and white supremacist ideology) is so insidious that it can
take hold even among the workers, women, and/or people of color who come to identify
their oppressor’s interests as their own.251
Indeed, Aristotle justifies exploitation and oppression within the ancient oikos by
claiming that all household members ultimately have shared interests, despite the hierarchy
of authority (i.e. domination: patriarch over wife, wife over slave, and even slave over
child.252 Aristotle paternalistically insists that ‘father knows best’ as to what will truly
benefit the patriarch’s subordinates.253 Accordingly, Aristotle considers it to be in these
subordinates’ own best interests to be ruled by ostensibly virtuous free males: both directly
in private economic role as patriarchal master and indirectly in public political role of
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1255b14-15). The problem is that he refuses to acknowledge all hierarchical social relations
(especially slavery) as products of power.
In its paradigmatic political sense, Aristotle defines ‘corruption’ as the condition of a ruling class
which serves its own private interest rather than the public interest (Aristotle, Politics III.vii
1279a28-30). In a relational sense, corruption’s basis as brute force becomes more obvious
(Politics I.vi 1255b13-15; Frank [2005], 167). The concept of corruption can even be extended to
other social phenomena, such as patriarchy or racist colonialism (Sankara, 341).
Joseph, 92.
Parsons, 1; Lenin, 63; Luxemburg, 79; Delphy, 76; Snow, 59. Historically, the suffering and
alienation of such social reproductive care workers are concealed and justified on the grounds
that they are contributing to the common good of a family, a business, or even a society. For this
reason, some theorists go so far as to say that marxist feminism is inherently corrupt because its
class struggle will always eclipse the anti-racist struggle against white supremacy (Hartmann, 2;
Joseph, 93).
For example, the ‘tyrannical’ rule of master over slave is supposedly in the interest of the latter as
well as of the former (Aristotle, Politics III.vi 1278b32-36).
Aristotle, Politics I.v 1254b12-21; Fortenbaugh, 261; Cole, 129.
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citizen.254 Otherwise, he worries, their decisions will be marred by irrationality and
therefore harm themselves and others.255
One of the capacities which the slave is prevented from exercising is phronesis: the
practical reasoning which fuels participation in democratic deliberation.256 For Aristotle,
only ruling class men are objective enough to judge what is good for each and for all.
However, while this is clearly an erroneous assumption, marxist feminists must also reckon
with their own spectre of paternalism which inevitably haunts even the most egalitarian of
their socialist projects.257 Marxist feminist theory cannot avoid claiming that many
oppressed and/or exploited people are ignorant of their own true interests (i.e. liberation),
an ideological position referred to as false consciousness.258 This lack of liberatory
consciousness can be found even among those various subalterns (racial, gender, sexual)
who standpoint epistemology predicts would be most aware of their own oppression and
whose particular interests are thought to represent the ultimate interests of all.259 Following
Aristotle, I argue that it is not possible to levy a critique of corruption against a purported
common good without also theoretically presupposing some true common good as a rubric
of critical comparison.260
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Aristotle, Politics I.xiii 1260a40.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII.xiv 1332b33-34.
Aristotle, Politics III.iv 1277b3-6, 1277b26-27.
Nussbaum (1990), 217.
Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 172.
Combahee River Collective, 23-24; Jones, 3; Sankara, 339.
Marx argues that every ruling class “represent[s] its interest as the common interest of all the
members of society” (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 174). Patricia Springborg observes
that even democratic structures have been criticized as actually being “the rule of the most
powerful under the guise of popular consent” (Springborg, 537).
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3.3 The Good: Interests, Needs, and Abilities
In order to determine what is in the interest of all, it is necessary (though
insufficient) to determine what is in the interest of each.261 Unlike modern liberal political
philosophers, ancient theorists and marxist feminists alike have proposed that the good of
the individual is congruent with or even identical to the good of society.262 Marxist
feminism’s implicit definition of goodness (or ‘interest’) must minimally involve not being
oppressed, dominated, exploited, or alienated—in a word, liberation.263 However,
“liberation” is a rectificatory concept, a ‘negation of a negation’ lacking in determinate
content.264 Even though marxist feminism’s (largely implicit) ethics schematizes goodness
through the purely formal concept of ‘liberation’, its content must include at least a partial
substantive good in the form of the socio-material conditions necessary for sustaining
freedom.265 Therefore, the implicit concept of goodness endorsed by marxist feminists
(especially Simone de Beauvoir) includes certain fulfilled needs and certain enabled
capabilities.
Even though marxist feminism’s normative project begins with the structural
positionality of classed, raced, gendered, and sexualized subalterns, it has universalizing
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A common good is a synergic condition which includes yet transcends the aggregate interests of
all individual members of a group. This is because the social system itself (whose condition can
be either commonly good or corrupt) is necessarily greater than the sum of its parts: the whole and
the parts co-determine one another (McNally, 110; Springborg, 545).
MacIntyre (1981), 232; Cooper (1975), 290; Kollontai, 230-31.
Mitchell, 43.
de Beauvoir, 31. Marx typically avoids speculation about communist conditions, insisting
minimally that they will involve “new social relations” (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology,
156; Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 91.
de Beauvoir, 78. While this definition of the good necessarily involves collective solidarity and
the dismantling of oppressive social systems, it need not rule out personal excellence as an
expression of the good (à la Aristotle). In fact, the marxist emphasis on humanity’s creative
capabilities might even suggest that excellence is the ultimate, albeit distant, good.
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aspirations and an objective (though implicit and minimalist) concept of the good.266 This
view is unexpectedly shared by Aristotle, who also approaches the universal form of
goodness only through the hierarchical differentiation of types of soul (albeit from the top
down rather than up from below).267 Aristotle treats the good not as an abstract form but as
a good for some particular entity (whose material components are organized by a specific
intelligible structure).268 For Aristotle, each entity has unique needs and latent capacities
required to survive and to thrive.269 However, despite all the physical and psychological
differences among people which Aristotle claims are natural grounds for hierarchical
ranking (especially class, gender, ethnicity and even age), he still classes all human beings
as sharing in some (if not all) of the conditions for human flourishing. Aristotle regards the
specifically human function (which is essential for eudaimonia) as acting according to
reason.270
This seemingly simplistic formulation of the distinctively human telos actually
involves an integration of soul and body, of reason and emotion, and of external goods
(which provide for needs) and internal goods (which produce virtuous action).271 Moreover,
although eudaimonia is often treated as an individual condition, Aristotle’s political theory
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For example, Claudia Jones argues that “the triply-oppressed status” of working class Black
women is “a barometer of the status of all women” (Jones, 3).
Depew, 67-68.
Aristotle, Metaphysics, VI.ii 1013a24-33, V.xii 1019a33-1019b3; Lloyd, 291-292.
Nussbaum, 211. This Aristotelian approach to form and function is adopted and adapted by Marx
(DeGolyer, 114).
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.vii 1098a12-15. Sherman notes that Aristotle cannot consistently
claim that virtuous action is inherently valuable if the ultimate telos is contemplation (theoria)
(Sherman, ix).
MacIntyre (1981), 158. While Cooper and others read Aristotle as treating external goods merely
as means to eudaimonia, Nussbaum and others read him as treating them as a part of eudaimonia
itself (Sherman, viii).
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makes it clear that it is necessarily a social condition: the combination of the requisite
internal and external goods of all members of society.272
Likewise, Aristotle considers the internal goods of virtue to be insufficient for
flourishing (eudaimonia); certain external goods are also necessary.273 Although goodness
does not reduce to material conditions, the provision of basic necessities (e.g. food, water,
shelter, and healthcare) are vital parts or preconditions for more complex abilities and
needs.274 Marxist feminists claim that there are many unmet needs (and inhibited
capabilities) caused by class structures which prevent the flourishing of all workers, but
especially women and people of color.275 Marx suggests that the need which labor should
fulfill is the ability to labor creatively as an end in itself, and he laments that alienating
conditions deform labor into “merely a means to satisfy needs external to it.”276 As Marx
puts it, capitalism reduces human freedom to merely “animal functions: eating, drinking,
procreating, or at most in his dwelling and in dressing up.”277 Capabilities can be cultivated
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X.viii 1178b33-1179a12; Nussbaum (1986), xiv; Ahmed, 44, 47;
Cooper (1975), 293.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.v 1095b32-1096a2; Annas, 35, 37. Aristotle technically
distinguishes between ‘external goods’ and ‘goods of the body,’ but they are functionally
identical when considering material use values in contradistinction to the internal goods he calls
virtues (MacIntyre [1981], 190).
Nussbaum, (1986), xxii; Nussbaum (1990), 241; Annas, 46. Because needs are often distinguished
from wants without a universally acceptable demarcation, I treat them as a continuum and use the
term “need” to refer to those desires which are closer to material reality and thus serve as
existential interests. People clearly have different material needs, due to differences in ability,
age, biosex, and even race. However, for the most part, these are simply specific versions of basic
material goods needed by (nearly) all.
Parsons, 1; Ferguson [2017], 120; Bhattacharya, 18). Although the concept of ‘race’ would not be
invented for another two millenia, the ancient Athenian slave population was largely composed
of foreign ethnicities (Aristotle, Politics 1285a19-22; Millett, 194).
Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 74.
Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 74.
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and maintained only if certain needs are met, but those needs must be provided by—or
through—certain capabilities (those of oneself or another).278
Needs are fulfilled by use values, which in turn are provided either directly by
nature or indirectly by labor (upon nature).279 As Marx writes, “Any distribution whatever
of the means of consumption is only a consequence of the distribution of the conditions of
production.”280 Workers control only the means of subsistence (the necessities of life), not
the means of production (the ability to generate surplus value).281 This provides workers
with their labor power, which (as Ferguson writes) “is a capacity of concrete, potentially
playful individuals whose needs and desires come into conflict with the capitalist impulse.”
282

For marxists, the maturation of needs varies directly with the development of creative

potential.283 Conversely, as Marx writes, alienated labor “does not develop freely [one’s]
physical and mental energy but mortifies [one’s] body and ruins [one’s] mind.”284
On one marxist feminist theory, even unique capabilities (e.g. unique biological
functions such as pregnancy) can serve as the basis for oppression and exploitation, if they
are absolutized to the detriment of other possible capacities.285 As marxist feminists have
theorized, social reproduction is the type of labor which reproduces only the basic needs of
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Marxists also describes this cycle of need-emergence and need-satisfaction with the economic
terminology of production and consumption (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 156).
However, Marx privileges production as the human species-essence, and views “consumption as a
phase of production” rather than vice versa (Dalla Costa and James, 50).
Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, 525.
Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, 531.
Bhattacharya, 77.
Ferguson, [2017], 129.
In Herbert Marcuse’s reflections on “Marxism and Feminism,” he defines liberation as a
“subversion of the established hierarchy of needs” (Marcuse, 285).
Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 74; Sayers, 164.
S. Smith, 4.
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life: those necessary to replenish the ability to labor.286 While this certainly involves
relational capabilities (“care and socialization”), it is rooted in fundamental material needs
(“food, clothing, and shelter”).287 The most illustrative social reproducer is a care worker
who is exploited on the basis of class and likely oppressed on the basis of their gender or
race or ethnicity.288 If they are classed as a (service-providing) producer, their labor
provides for the needs of a member of the ruling class in order to enable their leisure
activities (which may be higher-order in nature).289 By contrast, if they are classed as a
social reproducer, their labor provides for the needs of other workers, rejuvenating their
labor power in order to enable necessitarian activities. Of course, a worker might
simultaneously inhabit both positionalities, such as the slave in Aristotle’s depiction of the
ancient oikos.290 In the slave’s capacity as a care worker, they require the ability to meet the
needs of another (viz. the cared-for subject of their job).
One of the important needs is having the time and resources to develop one’s
abilities, such as (minimally) a worker’s requisite job skills. Of course, their needs and
abilities are severely limited under the exploitative conditions of class society (whether
slavery or capitalism). Because the most basic needs are not reliably provided to all and
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Federici, 5; Dalla Costa and James, 50; Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 156.
Laslett and Brenner, 382-383.
Social reproduction is a broader field than domestic labor and care work, but these are the most
concrete representations of the general phenomenon, even if at times they conceal more than they
illuminate (Arruzza, 21; Bezanson and Luxton, 26).
Cuffel, 338. de Beauvoir writes that the ‘leisure’ of the exploited “is just about sufficient for them
to regain their strength; the oppressor feeds himself on their transcendence”—that is, their ability
to surpass their present internal conditions (de Beauvoir, 83). Meanwhile, the worker’s needs and
abilities become a mere means to one other, resulting in a vicious circle rather than a spiral
dynamic of personal and social development.
Because the gender of slaves in ancient Athens (as in the colonial U.S.) was largely irrelevant to
the class structure, I will refer to the individual slave with gender-neutral “they” and “them”
pronouns (Cole, 129; Davis, 5). This has the additional benefit of grammatically distinguishing
the slave from the male patriarch and the female wife.
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most workers’ abilities are harnessed to benefit only the few, the social system neglects
their higher-level needs and arrests the growth of their higher-level abilities.291
I suggest that this situation of working class alienation can be framed in Aristotelian
terms, because Aristotle proposes that ‘the good’ (whether private or common) must
involve both internal goods (i.e. virtuous capabilities) and external goods (i.e.
socio-material conditions).292 For Aristotle, humans are conditioned by both their material
context and their transformative activity (political, economic, or otherwise). Accordingly,
contra Plato, certain external goods are necessary to enjoy the good life (eudaimonia).293
However, one’s external goods must often be supplied by other people.
The oikos is the social site responsible for mere survival, as opposed to the polis
which attends to actual flourishing.294 Accordingly, Aristotle writes that it is the “duty of the
manager of a household... to order the things which nature supplies.”295 However, this is a
truncated description: the responsibility of the household manager (officially the patriarch,
but technically the wife) is actually ordering those who provide order to nature’s raw
materials (i.e. the slave). In Aristotle’s analysis of the division of labor, in which
management is a second-order capacity (i.e. a form of intellectual labor), he refuses to
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This is implied by Aristotle himself: “For many necessaries of life have to be supplied before we
can have leisure” (Aristotle, Politics VII.xv 1334a18-19).
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.viii 1098b11-19. Aristotle also indicates a third type, bodily
good, but he does not distinguish it significantly from external good. He appears to denigrate
external goods by claiming that one’s telos is only internal to their soul, but shortly thereafter he
indicates that external goods are necessary means of such teleologically virtuous action
(Nicomachean Ethics I.viii 1099a32-1099b1).
Aristotle suggests that external goods are so morally significant that the deprivation of necessities
can exonerate working class crimes against the ruling class (Aristotle, Politics II.vii 1267a13-16).
Arendt, 24.
Aristotle, Politics I.x 1258a25-26.
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imagine that manual laborers could exercise sufficient practical reason to order their own
working conditions.

3.4 Phronesis: Practical Reason
Aristotle justifies the oikonomic hierarchy on the basis of a supposed gradation of
intellectual ability among the patriarch, housewife, slave, and child.296 As I discussed in
Chapter 2, there are two moral virtues (justice and care) which are clearly social in nature.
But in order to theorize the common good, it is necessary to turn (perhaps unexpectedly) to
Aristotle’s examination of intellectual virtue. Even though Aristotle is ambiguous about
whether the nature of eudaimonia consists of action or of contemplation, there is one
character trait which is valorized in both interpretations as both a moral and an intellectual
virtue: phronesis (practical reason or prudence).297 Whereas mere skill consists of knowing
how to produce (i.e. the means to a material end), phronesis consists of knowing how to act
(i.e. the means to a social end).298 Even though a given deliberation takes an end for
granted, a prior or subsequent deliberation can put this end-goal up for debate: “it is that
which has been decided upon as a result of deliberation that is the object of choice…
desired after deliberation.”299 At times, Aristotle describes phronesis as merely the
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Aristotle, Politics, I.xiii 1259b47-52. Aristotle lays out an is-ought distinction between the
conventional slave and the natural slave—the former of whom has the capacity for phronesis, and
the latter of whom supposedly does not (Ambler, 391).
Ackrill, 57. The soul’s virtues can be divided between intellectual and moral excellences
(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.i 1138b36-1139a1).
Whereas skill is amorally indifferent about its ends, phronesis must align with other virtues in
pursuing morally good ends; otherwise one would have to ascribe wisdom to a vicious person
who deliberately chooses effective means toward harmful ends (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
VI.xii 1144a36-37).
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III.3 1113a3-5. Aristotle views all moral decisions as deliberate
choices, but in intuitive action (which is the sense stressed by Martin Heidegger) one’s choice
might simply be what one might have decided upon deliberation (Cooper [1986], 9-10). Simone
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intellectual process of strategically working backward from a given end to determine the
appropriate tactics and initial steps.300 But rational deliberation and willful decision-making
about working conditions (i.e. the politics of labor) must involve considerations of ends as
well as means, if only because nearly all practical ends can also serve as means to deeper
ends. At other times, Aristotle acknowledges that phronesis also involves being “able to
deliberate well” about the conditions of “the good life.”301 By mediating between the
universal level of theoretical knowledge and the particular level of lived experience,
phronesis enables one to make judgments and to determine courses of action.302 This
condition of the intellect enables one to make judgments in light of wholistic
knowledge—in this case, knowledge concerning the conditions and aims of the entire
city-state and its constituent
households.303
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de Beauvoir demonstrates the reciprocal nature of ends and means in practical reasoning, which
dialectically scrutinizes not only means according to given ends, but also ends according to their
proposed means (de Beauvoir, 149, 155).
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III.3 1112b15-19. Aristotle appears to define phronesis as in part
the deliberation of means toward a given desirable end; however, this seems overly technical;
truly moral judgment would include choosing actions which, as instances of a rule, have
intrinsically value and are inherently good (i.e. virtuous), not merely instrumentally and
extrinsically good (Cooper [1986], 1-3).
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.v 1140a24-28. Phronesis provides the virtuous person with the
moral perception and situational awareness to determine which factors in a given context are
ethically significant in relation to the good life (Annas, 39; McDowell, 162). This is
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.vii 1141b15-16; Fortenbaugh, 242; McDowell, 156, 161. It is
clear from Aristotle’s corpus that practical reason (phronesis) is not the most absolutely valuable
form of reasoning: that accolade is reserved for purely theoretical reasoning. But whereas
Aristotle understands such contemplative reasoning as the unique function of the gods, practical
reasoning is the most appropriate function for the entity whose hylomorphic nature fuses mind
and matter: the human being (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.vii 1098a12-15; Ackrill, 70, 74;
Nussbaum [1986], xxvii). Therefore, while reason is not reducible to phronesis, the latter is the
exemplary manifestation of the former given the finitude which marks off the human condition.
Schofield, 318-19; Heath, 251.
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By contrast, Aristotle proposes that the slave and the wife require only the virtue of
skill: practical reasoning concerned with the production of objects.304 He insists that only
free citizens in their function of political rule require the practical virtue of phronesis.305
According to Aristotle, nature provides the male child of the wife and the patriarch with the
intellectual potential for phronesis, which will eventually be required by him to rule the
supposedly ‘irrational’ slave.306 By contrast, the slave is taken to lack phronesis not only as
the second-order voluntary choice but even as a first-order capability.307 Aristotle considers
the ‘natural slave’ to be intellectually disabled, deprived of the ability to exercise practical
reason; in fact, this is precisely his justification for classifying a slave as a slave.308
Aristotle correctly recognizes both the necessity of a socio-material basis for
political freedom and citizenship (i.e. natural resources and others’ labor) and the moral
significance of knowing how to rationally control production (because of its effect on
human potential).309 However, Aristotle is drastically wrong to assume that phronesis is
impossible for subalterns to develop: what he takes to be a natural disability is actually a
social disabling.310
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Heath, 247.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.i 1094a3-4, VI.v 1140a31-1140b2, VI.v 1140b20; Politics III.iv
1277b26-28; Schofield, 320; Tabachnik, 1000.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III.xii 1119b5-8; Politics, I.xiii 1260b19-20. However, this
capacity requires growth and education in order to truly become available for use.
Murphy argues that the recursive complexity of Aristotle’s “nature, habit, and reason model”
renders it superior to his simple “potency-act model” (Murphy, 225).
Aristotle, Politics I.v, 1254b20-23.
Swanson, 3-4.
Snow, 53.
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3.5 Regime Types: Systemic Social Goods
Just as individuals’ character states (internal goods) are affected by their external
conditions, social systems are conditioned by the characters of their members, who are
typically not equal in stature but differentiated by privilege and power.311 Just like
individuals, every social system (including the entire society as a whole) has both passive
needs and active abilities to sustain itself. The most politically significant ability is political
legislative authority.312 The representative nature of authority is synecdochal: there is some
part ‘standing in’ for the whole by standing ‘over’ it.313 In order to determine the nature of
political representation, Aristotle classifies regimes according to the quantity of rulers (who
ostensibly represent the interests of the populace back to them), which has implicit
qualitative (i.e. class) features.314
Aristotle inaugurates the discipline of political science by canvasing the
governments of regional nation-states and developing an institutional typology. There are
three basic regime types (or constitutions or polities), differentiated on a quantitative basis
(rule by one, by some, or by all) and further subdivided on a qualitative basis (rule for the
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Social reproduction theory explains these subclass oppressions according to the (gendered and
racialized) division of labor. Iris Marion Young argues that marxist feminists should wield this
concept (rather than ‘class’) to account for “specific cleavages and contradictions within a class”
(Young, 51). However, Marx actually agrees, claiming that “the division of labour determines also
the relations of individuals to one another with reference to the material, instrument, and product
of labour” (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 151).
Marx writes that “the State is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their
common interests” (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 187).
Aristotle ambiguously uses the same term (polis) to refer both to the entire society and its
dominant institution, the state (Mulgan, 17). In Book V of Politics, Aristotle explicitly frames
politics as class struggle for such state power (Austin and Vidal-Naquet, 22). Marx agrees, using
this Aristotelian model of state power to explain how the ruled revolt: “The class making a
revolution appears... as the representative of the whole of society; it appears as the whole mass of
society confronting the one ruling class” (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 174).
Finley, 5. de Ste. Croix argues that for Aristotle, the difference between political constitutions is
not actually the number of rulers, but rather their class. However, this is simply a function of class
society’s necessarily pyramidal sorting of a population. (de Ste. Croix, 72-73).
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common good or only for private interests).315 Aristotle actually treats democracy as a
corrupt constitutional form of rule by the many (i.e. the poor working class).316 He assumes
that the masses, like all classes, are tempted to rule viciously according to their own
interests. However, marxist feminists might resonate with Aristotle’s complementary
concept of politeia (a social democracy, according to Martha Nussbaum) whereby the
governing many rule in the interest of all (i.e. the common good).317 This accords with
marxist feminism’s mereological insistence that the interests of a particularly exploited and
oppressed subclass can actually represent and rule in the interests of all.318
Marxist theory actually accords with Aristotle’s model: a particular class can only
gain power by claiming to represent the will of the whole society (the common good) and
by scapegoating another particular class (the common enemy).319 The ideologies
legitimizing both ancient slavery and modern capitalism both purport to serve the interests
of all (through paternalism in the former and trickle-down economics in the latter). Yet even
though Aristotle errs in his reactionary grading of social positionalities, marxists agree with
him that the primary question of the common good is whether or not the needs of all are
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Aristotle, Politics III.vii 1279a26-30; Ambler, 398; Mulgan, 60.
Aristotle, Politics III.vii 1279b5; Strauss, 36. Mulgan points out that Aristotle’s quantitative
approach to determining constitutional regime types is actually a proxy for qualitative class
analysis, because “the wealthy are usually few and the poor usually many” (Mulgan, 63).
Nussbaum interprets Aristotle’s assignment of resource provision to the government as a form of
“welfare state” (Nussbaum [1990], 204).
However, even though Aristotle assumes that practical judgment inevitably tends to one’s own
affairs, he does not limit phronetic decisions to self-interest at the expense of others’ interests
(Cherry, 1409). Intersectional marxist feminists extend this belief even further: for instance, the
Combahee River Collective proposes that a political project which liberates Black lesbian
working class women (such as themselves) would ultimately involve the freedom of all (less
oppressed) people (Combahee River Collective, 22-23).
Marx, “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” 62. In surmising how the
state will transform “in communist society”, Marx warns that “one does not get a flea-hop nearer
to the problem by a thousandfold combination of the word ‘people’ with the word ‘state’” (Marx,
Critique of the Gotha Program, 538).
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being met. The question of who has the institutional ability (i.e. power) to fulfill those
needs is of secondary importance. It is much less likely that a subaltern group’s needs will
be met if they do not personally have the ability to meet them; however, it is not impossible.
Aristotle considers ways in which one, some, or many rulers can achieve the common good
by meeting the needs of all.

3.6 Scaling Down: From Polis Rule to Oikos Rule
Politics is not merely rule within the state, but rule within any power structure,
including the workplace. Just as feminism insists that the personal is political, marxists insist
that the economic is political.320 The oikos exists within all of these dimensions: ancient
Greek society did not differentiate between economics and politics in the same way as
liberal capitalist society.321 Rather than treating them as two different domains in which
each citizen (of any class, race, or gender) has power, Greek social life endowed patriarchs
with political and economic power, and women and slaves with political
disenfranchisement and economic subjugation.322
For Aristotle, the political decision-making capacity of the property-owning
patriarch not only applies at the state level of the polis, but also at the workplace level of the
oikos.323 He (or the manager who acts on his behalf) must exercise practical reason in
deciding both why workers should labor (including which goods and services they
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Hartmann, 13; Joseph, 97; Bhattacharya, 9.
Aristotle, Politics I.i 1252b13-18; Austin and Vidal-Naquet, 10.
Clark, 189; Elshtain, 15-16.
In Thomas Smith’s reading ofAristotle, the degree of corruption in the oikos depends on the
degree of corruption in the polis (T. Smith, 631).
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produce) and how they should labor in producing them.324 These questions cannot be
answered without reference to state-level political conditions, nor can these latter be
addressed in isolation from the socio-material conditions of production and social
reproduction.
While the rule of the polis itself is restricted to all, some, or even one citizen (a title
which is already reserved for free, property-owning males).325 However, as with the
macrocosmic polis, the microcosmic oikos is assumed to serve the interests (however
underestimated) of all its members, not merely the head of the household.326 Aristotle
examines how the common good (as a governing principle) functions in the oikos, as the
key economic site of production and social reproduction in the ancient polis.327 As with the
polis, the oikos is thought to be a just and legitimate institution insofar as it serves the
diverse interests of its members (whose unique and varying natures feature different
abilities and needs). By borrowing his own political terminology of the city-state, Aristotle
analogically ‘scales down’ the evaluative political schema of the common good and
corruption from the level of the city-state.328 The six types of relationships which constitute
the oikos (patriarch-wife, wife-slave, slave-child, patriarch-slave, patriarch child,
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.viii 1141b30-34; Cherry, 1409.
The right of citizenship (i.e. political participation in state power) is rooted in property relations:
citizens must own property and the propertyless cannot be citizens (Austin and Vidal-Naquet,
23-24). Of course, as Marx writes the original type of property is “slavery in the family” (Marx
and Engels, The German Ideology, 159).
Aristotle, Politics I.xiii 1260b9-14.
Insofar as Aristotle claims that “a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life”
(Aristotle, Politics III.i 1275b20-21).
Aristotle, Politics III.xiv 1285b31-33. The obvious critique here is that a microcosmic example
commits the fallacy of composition, inductively inferring that the whole system shares the
structure of one of its parts. However, several SRT theorists have emphasized that dialectics
requires mereological thinking, whereby parts and wholes often reflect each other, co-constitute
each other, and even pass into one another (McNally, 103; Ferguson [2016], 47) .
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wife-child) each have their own appropriate type of rule according to the allegedly inferior
natures and virtues of the subordinates.329
Patriarchal rule involves policing both the rights and the duties of subordinate
household members. The wife, slave, and child are all graded according to their supposed
capacity to achieve a specific internal good: the intellectual virtue of practical reason
(phronesis). Because (according to Aristotle) the patriarch alone has the capacity for
authoritative phronesis, he is both free (i.e. not enslaved) and empowered with citizenship
rights (i.e. enabled to rule).330 Because the wife lacks the social authority to exercise her
potential phronesis, she is denied the right of citizenship despite being free (i.e. not
enslaved).331 The slave is doubly oppressed, being denied both freedom and citizenship
rights (or, in marxist feminist terms, liberation and power) on the grounds that they
supposedly lack even the psychological potential for practical reason.332 The child is only
temporarily subjugated on the assumption that they will eventually gain the practical reason
to govern not only their own passions but also other ‘less rational’ subjects. For Aristotle,
each of these power relations contain a common good which serves the differing interest of
ruled as well as ruler.333 However, this would be a degraded and alienating form of
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Aristotle, Politics I.xii 1259b2-4; I.xiii 1259b45-48.
Aristotle, Politics, I.xiii 1260b28-31; III.iv 1277b14-28. Marx writes that until now, only the
ruling class has been truly free, meaning that their freedoms are really just privileges (Marx and
Engels, The German Ideology, 197-8).
Aristotle, Politics I.xiii 1260a14; 1260b20; Wright, 212; Horowitz, 207. Of course, Aristotle’s
claim that women lack sufficiently recognized authority can imply that men possess excessive
and irrational authority (Nichols, 32; Levy, 405).
Aristotle, Politics I.xiii 1260b13-14. As Frank explains, phronesis is “what Aristotle calls a
second-level capability... an actualization of a first-level capacity” through deliberate choice
(Frank [2004], 96). Anyone denied the opportunity to make such a first-level decision cannot
fully exercise the second-level of phronesis (Schofield, 321).
Aristotle, Politics I.v 1254a24-28; Cuffel, 331; Swanson, 18.
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community; even on Aristotle’s own account, the purpose of rule is to instill not only
obedience but virtue… which would delegitimize the grounds for hierarchy.

3.7 Alienation and Democratic Autonomy
The classed and gendered division of labor in the oikos is not only oppressive and
exploitative (i.e. corruptly serving only the ruling class interests of the patriarch).334 It is also
inherently alienating, estranging the wife and the slave from themselves, other people, the
goods they produce, and even their own working conditions and productive processes.335
This dynamic is most clearly illustrated by the fact that the slave might be called upon as a
tutor to educate the child who will become their future master.336 As Aristotle would have
it, the slave has the capability to train another to eventually manage the slave’s working
conditions, but the slave lacks this capability themself, requiring their own manager.337 A
marxist feminist would reject Aristotle’s justification of ‘natural’ slavery not only as
reprehensible but also as obviously false: the extent to which a slave (or any superexploited
worker) lacks capabilities is simply the extent to which they are being intellectually or
physically stunted by political decisions made by more powerful others.338 Thus, the slave
suffers from not only exploitation and ethnic oppression, but also alienation.339 In marxism,
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Wright, 207, 214.; Nichols, 32.
Swanson is only partially correct in describing this condition as “diversified excellence” (19, 23).
Marx views this condition of class-formation in a much more insidious light (Marx, Economic
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 74, 77).
Aristotle, Politics, VII.xvii 1336a40-1336b3. Aristotle indicates a difference between the
enslaved tutor and other slaves (who he says have a bad influence on the child) which suggests
that even on his own classist model, at least some slaves possess a measure of virtue.
This contradiction is even stronger in Elshtain’s reading of Aristotle, in which the family (and not
the polis) humanizes people via education in reason and language (Elshtain, 49).
Murphy, 5. In case this sounds offensive, one need only consider the impact of the privatization
of schools and hospitals upon the bodies and minds of the impoverished.
Marx insists that economic value and moral virtue should affirm one another, but alienation
82

this is the condition of the estrangement of the laboring producer from their produced object
(or, more relevantly, reproduced subject). As Marx writes (both literally and figuratively),
the “worker becomes a slave of his object.”340
All class-based modes of production (whether patriarchal slavery or patriarchal
capitalism) alienate workers from themselves both in body and in mind.341 Aristotle leaps
from recognizing the psychological difference between intellectual activity and bodily
productivity to positing a social division of mental and manual labor.342 This is made even
worse by his evident privileging of mind over matter, which entails a workplace hierarchy
of management’s mental labor and workers’ concrete labor (producing either physical
goods or relational services).343 Not only are these productive ends of their labor
determined externally by their employers and managers, but their processual means of
accomplishing these tasks are often governed by rules and best practices over which they
have had no autonomous input.344
By contrast, marxist feminists suggest that if workers collectively took ownership of
their means of production, they could also thereby take ‘ownership’ of themselves.345
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entails that they oppose one another antagonistically (DeGolyer, 138).
Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 72-73. Marx indicates four aspects to
alienation: estrangement from one’s self (“species being”), one’s products, other people, and
nature (75-77).
Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 150. Social reproductive workers are especially
estranged from their psychological experiences, because much of care work and service work
involves emotional labor.
Murphy, 8. Moreover, the slave’s manual labor is the material condition of possibility for the
master, whose intellectual ‘labor’ is the ordering principle for the slave (Aristotle, Politics I.iv
1253b24-34; Swanson, 41). However, Sharkey points out that on Aristotle’s account, all human
beings are constituted by both form and by matter, so it is erroneous of him to posit hierarchical
binaries between different types of human being on such a basis (Sharkey, 120).
Aristotle, Politics I.vii 1255b34-35; Fortenbaugh, 243.
Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 160, 191; Murphy, 226. Following Marx, Arruzza shows
that the conditions of production and social reproduction (re)produce the worker as a particular
type of subject, for better or for worse (Arruzza, 18).
Weeks stresses the importance of considering workplaces as political “sites of decision-making”
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Historically, the working class has organized in two types of democratic institutions—labor
unions and worker cooperatives—to mitigate the exploitation of labor and the alienation
from workplace control.346 In labor unions, workers collectively unite against the owners
and managers, while in worker cooperatives workers collectively unite to become owners
and self-managers.347 Both labor unions and worker-owned co-ops call for prudence not
only synchronically (at the micro-level of short-term self-interest) but also diachronically (at
the macro-level of long-term altruism).348
While the short-term goal of radicals in both institutions is to meet the needs of
themselves and their comrades, the long-term goal is to transition into a post-capitalist,
post-racist, post-patriarchal society that serves the full spectrum of needs (varying according
to positionality).349 These would include not only the lower-level needs of subsistent
survival (i.e. labor power replenished by social reproduction), but also those higher level
needs of the development of human capabilities. These can and should be enabled by the
state, provided that it has been structured according to socialist principles (often through the
pressure of liberation movements). Yet marxists hope that even the state will eventually
wither away. This presupposes development of a social order in which the needs and
capabilities of all are both socially supported yet not socially determined.350

346

347
348

349
350

(Weeks, 2). However, while Marxists call for the workers to own the means of production, it is
unclear whether there should be direct ownership of these instruments, or rather representative
ownership as a class.
Wolff, 174. These function as prefiguratively communistic social relations within the dominant
class system, demonstrating that a common good is possible to cultivate, at least at the small scale
(Sayers, 169).
Wolff, 3, 12.
However, Rosa Luxemberg warns that without more explicit political organizations:
“Cooperatives and trade unions are totally incapable of transforming the capitalist mode of
production” (Luxemburg, 50).
Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, 537.
Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 160.
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However, there is one capability which would be normative for all citizens to
develop: the intellectual virtue of phronesis. For economic institutions such as labor unions
and worker co-ops, the condition of democracy at work is both the (partial) means and the
(partial) end of the socialist movement in which they often participate. Democracy calls
forth the practical reasoning of all participants. The collective habit of democratic
participation can and should be practiced prefiguratively at the small scale as preparation
for large scale socialist transformation.351 Practical reason, therefore, is not only
instrumentally valuable as a means of providing for the material needs of oneself or another.
Phronesis is also an inherently valuable end in itself, a part of the set of virtues which
constitute the good life.352 Accordingly, marxist feminists cannot actually disagree with
Aristotle’s framing of the active citizen’s phronesis as the necessary connection point
between ethics and politics.353 Rather, they merely expand the pool of agents who are
encouraged to develop the virtue of practical reason through experience in collective
decision-making.354
For care workers performing social reproductive labor, a major impediment to
democratizing their workplaces is their suppression of phronesis by their management (as
local agents of the capitalist superstructure, or “ideological state apparatus”). It is no insult
to the workers’ technical intelligence to point out that their work life has been designed to
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352

353
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Wolff, 148. However, small-scale prefiguration is limited: Aristotle claims that the microstructural
oikos cannot flourish without the support of the macrostructural polis (Dobbs, 35).
Ahmed, 47. The internal goods are virtues, which may possibly serve as partial means to causally
achieve eudaimonia, but which must necessarily serve as the component parts of the whole
eudaimonistic state (Ackrill, 61-2).
Nichols, 3, 5. This is not to simply identify marxist feminist communism with Aristotelian
eudaimonia; rather, it is to treat them as necessary conditions for the emergence of one another
(Ahmed, 32).
Nichols, 5-6.
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prevent the development of class consciousness: the awareness of how their working
conditions are connected to national and international political decisions, and how their
interests and those of their bosses align with their counterparts elsewhere. Because
alienated workers are not allowed to make deliberative decisions even about their own
work life, they do not develop the particular kind of strategic judgment required for civic
participation in state rule over the rest of their lives.355

3.8 Confluences and Conflicts of Interests
Even though there were no slave revolts or abolitionists in ancient Greece, Aristotle
takes the possibility of revolution very seriously.356 He emphasizes the necessity of social
stability for avoiding revolution by other strata of the working class. To theorize optimal
social stability, Aristotle examines the material and moral interests of each major social
positionality, including each member of the oikos.357 Because the wife appears to belong to
her husband’s class, she is a common enemy of all her slaves (who have a shared interest in
her removal).358 As a labor-aristocratic manager, the wife would have no immediate interest
in joining any slave rebellion against her ruling class husband.359 This is the case even if her
355

356

357

358

359

However, this by no means implies that the exploitative private realm of production impedes the
development of any virtues; in fact, Swanson reads Aristotle as treating the private worksite as an
“opportunity to actualize virtue” albeit at a degraded level (Swanson, 2).
Finley, 109; Mulgan, 43; de Ste. Croix, 73, 75 . A marxist explanation for the lack of slave revolts
in ancient Greece would not likely point to any failures of the slaves themselves, but rather the
historical conditions for overthrowing the ancient mode of production (slavery) which were not
yet sufficiently developed to facilitate a wave of revolts.
Although revolution paradigmatically refers to an upheaval of a state’s constitution, it also
applies to the nature of the family, which has also changed from form to form throughout history,
to the point where marxist feminists imagine its eventual obsolescence (Kollontai, 1-2).
In order to build a positive common good, the working class (along with the Black community,
women, and other subalterns) first identify, rally against, and defeat the ruling class, who
constitute a common enemy: the negative inverse of the common good (Davis, 142; Marx and
Engels, The German Ideology, 199).
In fact, as Finley shows, there is not even historical evidence of another segment of the working
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slave is also female, and they might be expected (by non-marxist feminists) to share
gender-based solidarity.
However, as previously discussed, the wife’s managerial function is a type of labor
(albeit privileged). Her physical well-being (a fundamental set of needs) is dependent upon
her ability and willingness to perform her assigned duties. This implies that, strictly
speaking, she is actually a member of the working class, who are not only economically
exploited but who are also politically alienated as non-citizens. The wife is technically free
(not enslaved) but, like the slave, she is also deprived of the right to governance (including
political decisions affecting her workplace).360 Thus, it is not clear why the wife (despite
her rational fear of retribution) does not also have an interest in becoming empowered to
fully realize her potential (as a worker as well as a citizen).
While the wife’s compromised positionality (as a class traitor to her enslaved
co-workers) provides for her needs, it stultifies her abilities. Her husband strips her of the
capacity to live a public life. Thus, the wife shares with the slave a common good (however
negative) in the form of the possibility of overthrowing the rule of patriarch. In a vacuum, it
is not inconceivable that the slave—or rather, slaves—could persuade her to join them in
overthrowing the master’s rule.361

360

361

class, the “free poor… joining with the slaves in a common struggle” (Finley, 107).
On Levy’s reading, Aristotle’s only problem with including women in state rule is a lack of
political education, which can and should be rectified (Aristotle, Politics II.vi 1264b37-1276a12;
Levy, 407).
Of course, this is possibility is highly speculative: the only record of a coordinated women’s
movement is the fictional sex strike in Aristophanes’ 5th-century comedy Lysistrata (Austin and
Vidal-Naquet, 26). However, for present purposes, I am not interested in the implausibility of such
a common struggle; instead, I am simply performing is a conceptual analysis of the lode-bearing
notion of ‘interests’ within marxist feminist theory.
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Not only is Aristotle’s refusal to acknowledge the personal and social benefits of
empowering the slave and wife appalling—it is also tragically unnecessary.362 Although
Aristotle assumes that necessitarian labor and freedom are mutually exclusive, this is
directly at odds with his theory of human nature as bodies ensouled with the psychological
potentiality for reason.363 Thus, as rational animals, all human beings should be able to both
labor and to deliberate—and to deliberate about how to labor. If the wife and the slave were
granted the ability to control their own working conditions, they would quickly develop (or,
more precisely, expand) their phronesis through managing the means and ends of their own
labor. And since Aristotle claims that women and ‘natural’ slaves are structurally unable to
develop this virtue, any empirical demonstration of phronesis by these subalterns would
undermine the normative force ensuring their paternalistic subordination.364 He is, to say the
least, unwarranted in inferring a lack of ability based on continued coercion into degrading
socio-economic roles.365
Such pseudo-meritocracy is not merely a relic of ancient patriarchal slavery; it
persists even into late-stage patriarchal racialized capitalism.366 The problem is not merely
that the class system ignores the intellectual needs of the super-exploited workers, nor even
that it seeks to keep them from gaining the critical thinking skills required to overthrow the
ruling class (e.g. by preventing slaves from learning to read).367 The ultimate problem is that
when the most abject members of the working class do in fact exhibit the ability to
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Elshtain, 53.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.xiii 1102b29-31; Arendt, 72-73.
This has, unsurprisingly, been demonstrated historically, from Black Reconstruction to the
Petrograd Soviet.
Elshtain, 43; Wright, 212.
Arruzza, Bhattacharya, & Fraser, 11.
Davis, 22.
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autonomously control their own environment, it reveals them to have the same rational
faculties as their would-be superiors.368 Such democratic participation in ruling their social
institutions (including their jobs) would allow the working class—whether ancient or late
modern—to expand their capabilities and to provide for the needs of all.

3.9 Virtuous Circles
In the long term, both the privileged productive laborers and the marginalized social
reproductive laborers who constitute the working class share an objective interest in
abolishing class society and pursuing a common good.369 But in the short- to mid-term, the
exploitative status quo induces conflicts of interest between these sub-classes.370 Thus,
solidarity between them is not a given—instead, such a common good must be constructed.
The common good depends upon contingent conditions at the personal level of a moral
agent whose character manifests virtues (e.g. care, justice, and practical reason) and/or
vices (e.g. active injustice or passive complicity, whether out of ignorance or willful
malice). The common good also depends on the social conditions determined in large part
by property distribution according to political decisions (made by ruling bodies which can
be more or less democratic in nature).371 Because the populace contains fluctuating and
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On Aristotle’s own theory, they should be recognized as fellow citizens in a social democracy
(Bradshaw, 557; Nussbaum (1990), 203, 208, 233. This is simply a positive reading of Aristotle’s
warning that changing the social functions of the alienated and exploitative oikos will negatively
impact the whole social order (Coole, 29).
Arruzza notes that men, unlike capitalists, have nothing to lose if women’s domestic labor is
socialized (Arruzza, 8). In the abstract, this even extends to the uppermost tiers of the
bourgeoisie—ultimately, a common good should be available to all. But revolutionary history
shows that the ruling classes are extremely reticent to recognize this possibility.
Laslett and Brenner, 391; McAlevey, 158. Similarly, Hartmann writes that even though men’s and
women’s interests may coincide “in the long run,” they are opposed in the short term
(Hartmann, 9).
Yack, 3-4. Aristotle doubts that citizen-legislators can incentivize the common use of common
89

uneven levels of need-fulfillment and capability-development, the common good is
inescapably a provisional confluence of interests.372 For this reason, the citizen-rulers
require context-specific phronesis to leverage existing goods (both internal and external) as
means toward the end of achieving further ends and greater goods.
There is a cyclical relationship between the internal goods consisting of
virtue-honed capabilities (such as phronesis) and external goods which provide for
socio-material needs. Certain external goods are existentially necessary for an agent to even
live long enough to develop virtues, while some internal goods (such as the virtue of
phronesis) are necessary for them to even secure those goods at all.373 Analogously, each
socio-economic system is reproduced by the dialectical connection between material base
needs (the ‘lowest common denominator’ of shared interests) and the intentional strategic
choices made by the ruling class of citizen-legislators (whose practical reasoning may be
more or less virtuous in nature).374
Marxist feminists proclaim as a key article of faith that the privileged have a moral
obligation to struggle on behalf of the oppressed—perhaps to the point of opposing their
own interests. However, they also recognize that advocating such altruism among their
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(state) property, so he counsels them to incentivize the virtue of benevolence among private
property owners and indirectly enable its common use (Aristotle, Politics II.v 1263a16-39;
Dobbs, 39-40). Yet even though this account may seem quite idealist by marxist standards, it is
based on Aristotle’s empirical analysis of human behavior... within a distributive matrix that has
already been concretely determined by the contingent decisions of citizen-legislators.
This is merely the inverse of how oppressive modes of production (especially capitalism) may
repeatedly reconfigure social positionalities to perpetuate ruling class corruption (Arruzza, 14).
Annas, 43. Aristotle writes that virtuous activity “needs the external goods as well; for it is
impossible, or at least difficult, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. In many actions
we use friends and riches and political power as instruments (Nicomachean Ethics I.viii
1099a32-33).
Nussbaum (1990), 204.
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privileged allies is clearly inadequate as their primary political strategy.375 After all,
capitalist patriarchy is partially constituted by economic conditions, and Marx writes that
every “radical revolution” is driven by “a material basis… the needs of the people.”376 But
on the Aristotelian model of moral development, it is actually possible for prudent
(‘phronetic’) organizers to leverage economic self-interest into some degree of altruistic
solidarity.377
The marxist feminist tradition has always had one foot in history and theory and the
other in political praxis; training in both (via the experience of liberatory struggle) is
required to make strategic judgments reconciling means with ends and particulars and
universals.378 Through such practical reasoning (i.e. Aristotelian phronesis), marxist
feminists can determine which people might share converging interests with them, even if
those interests are purely egoistic material needs.379 Unlike bourgeois liberalism, marxist
feminism leverages feelings of solidarity, whereby “an injury to [one] is actually an injury
to all.”380 By appealing to such enlightened self-interest, marxist feminists can construct a
common good within and across (sub)class divisions, building a culture of solidarity in
which relational experiences can cultivate more altruistic motives and virtues.381 The
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Bhattacharya, 15, 17. This is the case even with perhaps the most famous articulation of
intersectionality, the Combahee River Collective Statement. Even as they cite the need to center
the multiply oppressed, they recognize the limits of altruism: “We believe that the most profound
and potentially most radical politics come directly out of our own identity, as opposed to working
to end somebody else's oppression” (Combahee River Collective, 19).
Marx, “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” 61. As Silvia Federici
writes, “welfare buys women more autonomy from men” (Federici, 48).
Frank (2005), 153; McAlevey, 56.
McAlevey, 201, 11.
As Ruth Groff proposes, “Aristotle’s concept of phronesis is a natural one for Marxists to endorse
when it comes to theorizing the nature of ethical judgment” (Groff, 313).
Bhattacharya, 89-90.
Luxemburg, 216, McAlevey, 29; T. Smith, 628. Simone de Beauvoir emphasizes the inherently
intersubjective dimension of liberation: to “will oneself free is also to will others free” (de
Beauvoir, 73).
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political decisions involved in building such coalitional common goods requires precisely
the Aristotelian intellectual and moral virtue of phronesis.
Consider the example of a care worker who (along with her comrades in her labor
union) has decided to go on strike from her (waged) social reproductive labor.382 In
self-interestedly pursuing her own individual good (higher wages, better working
conditions, and greater job autonomy), each striking care worker pursues the good of her
union. In pursuing the good of her union, she also pursues the interest of her class, race,
and gender.383 And in pursuing the interest of her subordinate class, she pursues the true
interest of her entire society.384 True political struggle—even for self-interested
motives—does not leave its subjects untouched.385 In the process, it transforms them and
elevates their interests and ends—not only the fulfillment of their individual needs, but their
development of more sophisticated capabilities by which to serve (and expand) the interests
of others.386 The common good—the communist good—is one in which abilities and needs
cohere in a mutually reinforcing virtuous circle. Marx and Engels famously describe such a
society as one in which “the free development of each is the condition for the free
development of all.”387
I conclude that within any class society, the common good which is actually shared
by different classes, genders, and races (or ethnicities) is an interest in constructing
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These industries—highly feminized, highly racialized, highly social reproductive—such as
healthcare, education, and food services—are the new sites of labor struggle in the 21st century
(McAlevey, 20).
McAlevey, 158-9.
McAlevey, 204.
de Beauvoir, 128.
Frank (2005), 175-76.
Marx and Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party, 491.
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solidarity.388 The harmonization of conflicting interests is, simply put, neither possible or
impossible. Rather, the very possibility of a common good is contingent upon the internal
and external conditions of multiple individuals in different social and economic
positionalities. A solidaristic common good between different classes, genders, and races
may well not actually exist, but it can become possible. Such an achievement will require
the exercise of phronesis, the most essential capability for democratic deliberation about the
just distribution of necessities and the means of accomplishing it.389 I suggest that Aristotle’s
theory of moral character, especially the virtue of phronesis, can serve as a surprisingly
effective model for marxist feminists to address power differentials in a strategic way which
builds toward liberation.

3.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, I analyze the conditions under which a common good (a confluence
of interests) would be possible between different strata of the working class, particularly
across the gendered and racialized division of labor between productive and social
reproductive workers. I consider critiques by marxists and feminists that ‘common good’
discourse (such as Aristotle’s foundational conception), when deployed under present
conditions of domination, both ignores differences in need and ability (due largely to
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As Maria Mies recounts her students’ slogan in the women’s movement, “Struggle unites us!”
(Mies, viii).
Phronesis is an instrumentally valuable means, which is by no means exhausted in either
liberation struggles or in statecraft. Yet it is also an inherently valuable end (Yack, 11-12). In both
of these aspects, phronesis is a necessary—though not sufficient—condition for the good life,
individually and collectively.
93

classed gendered and raced conditioning) and ideologically conceals domination by
coercing the oppressed and exploited to substitute their oppressors’ interests for their own.
I have responded that marxist feminism’s socialist principle (‘From each according
to their ability, to each according to their need’) is actually a specific version of the
Aristotelian common good. Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory conceptualizes the good in
terms of both external goods (material use values for physical needs) as well as internal
goods (the virtuous condition of rationally habituated affects). Similarly, marxist feminist
analysis is primarily interested in certain basic needs (viz. food, water, shelter, security,
healthcare, transportation, and education) which in turn empower and condition human
capabilities. Thus, human life is not only reproduced through this cycle of needs and
abilities, but is naturally self-transcending. By reducing such transcendence to subsistence,
class systems alienate workers by debasing their needs and incapacitating their abilities,
thereby all but precluding a common good.
I have shown that what marxists and feminists view as ideological
pseudo-universality is precisely what Aristotle calls corruption, whereby a particular
interest falsely asserts itself as representing the interest of the whole. Using these
definitions, Aristotle develops a normative theory of regime types in which institutional
legitimacy requires that each ruler serve the interests of all (i.e. the common good) rather
than only their own interests (i.e. corruption). On this definition, patriarchal racialized
capitalism does not merely permit, reward, or even cause corruption; instead, by definition,
it is an inherently corrupt system.
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I have recounted how Aristotle’s common good schema, originally developed to
evaluate the legitimacy of a political state, is also applied microcosmically to the economic
worksite of the household (oikos). Within the ancient familial slave economy, Aristotle
prescribes a specific hierarchical rule to each relationship: husband over wife, master over
slave, wife over slave, father over child, and slave over child. These forms of rule are
drawn from political regime types, which either function justly for the common good or
function unjustly for corrupt private interests. Aristotle ranks the socio-economic
positionalities of the patriarch, the wife, the slave and the child according to their
(in)abilities to politically exercise phronesis: practical reason or prudence. Aristotle insists
that this capacity (for rationally acting to benefit others and self) gives the patriarchal master
the right to not only control the workplace but also participate as a free citizen in the
autonomous rule of the state. While marxist feminists would reject as absurd the claim that
women and the enslaved cannot exercise practical wisdom, they would acknowledge that
the oppressed have (by definition) been prevented from developing phronesis (which is
necessary for democratic collective autonomy) by being systematically denied the
experience of ruling at any level beyond one’s own workplace (e.g. the oikos).
I have argued that, as with his notion of the common good, Aristotelian phronesis is
not merely a ruling class characteristic; it is also indispensable for working class liberatory
struggles which must navigate socio-political contingencies with principled stances. The
utopian goal of communism, in which democratic structures rationally coordinate the needs
and abilities of all, would entail that all citizens cultivate this deliberative virtue of phronesis
through participation in the governance structures responsible for fulfilling basic needs.
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I have demonstrated that marxist feminists would agree with Aristotle’s claim that
only the practically wise should rule, because otherwise the common good—the needs and
abilities of all—will not be served. Yet because marxist feminists are committed to actual
democracy (at least in the long term), they must insist that everyone should develop
phronesis. (Contra Aristotle’s ideological circular logic, everyone must be said to have this
potential). By building autonomous workplace institutions such as labor unions and
worker-owned co-ops, workers (especially multiply oppressed care workers) can exercise
practical reason in democratic deliberation over their own means of production. In the
meantime, as the exploited and the oppressed struggle against their common enemy, their
shared experience trains them in the virtue of practical reason and expands their capacity
for collective autonomous decision-making. This shared capability increases the likelihood
of providing for not only their own needs but also for those of others. The collectively
deployed virtue of phronesis is both a strategic means toward—and an end prefiguratively
manifesting—the good life which Aristotle calls eudaimonia and which marxist feminists
call liberation or even communism. The more that citizens—comrades—exercise internal
goods (such as the virtuous capability of phronesis), the more capable they will be in
making strategic decisions as history unfolds dialectically. And the prudent decisions they
will make will strategically connect the diverse needs and abilities among different social
positionalities in order to open up new solidaristic possibilities for a common good.
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